Metaphor:
A Practical Introduction

ZOLTÁN KÖVECSES

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Exercises written with
Szilvia Csábi,
Réka Hajdú,
Zsuzsanna Bokor,
& Orsolya Izsó

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To

GEORGE

&

MARK

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Preface:
The Study of
Metaphor

For most of us, metaphor is a figure of speech in which one thing is compared to another by saying that one is the other, as in *He is a lion*. Or, as the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* puts it: "*metaphor* [is a] figure of speech that implies comparison between two unlike entities, as distinguished from *simile*, an explicit comparison signalled by the words 'like' or 'as.'" [emphases in the original]. For example, we would consider the word *lion* to be a metaphor in the sentence "Achilles was a *lion* in the fight." We would probably also say that the word is used metaphorically in order to achieve some artistic and rhetorical effect, since we speak and write metaphorically to communicate eloquently, to impress others with "beautiful," esthetically pleasing words, or to express some deep emotion. Perhaps we would also add that what makes the metaphorical identification of Achilles with a *lion* possible is that *Achilles* and *lions* have something in common, namely, their bravery and strength.

Indeed, this is a widely shared view—the most common conception of metaphor, both in scholarly circles and in the popular mind (which is not to say that this is the *only* view of metaphor). This traditional concept can be briefly characterized by pointing out five of its most commonly accepted features. First, metaphor is a property of words; it is a linguistic phenomenon. The metaphorical use of *lion* is a characteristic of a linguistic expression (that of the word *lion*). Second, metaphor is used for some artistic and rhetorical purpose, such as when Shakespeare writes "all the world's a *stage*." Third, metaphor is based on a resemblance between the two entities that are compared and identified. Achilles must share some features with lions in order for us to be able to use the word *lion* as a metaphor for Achilles. Fourth, metaphor is a conscious and deliberate use of words, and you must have a special talent to be able to do it and do it well. Only great poets or eloquent speakers, such as, say, Shakespeare and Churchill, can be its masters. For instance, Aristotle makes the following statement to this effect: "The great-

est thing by far is to have command of metaphor. This alone cannot be imparted by another; it is the mark of genius." Fifth, it is also commonly held that metaphor is a figure of speech that we can do without; we use it for special effects, and it is not an inevitable part of everyday human communication, let alone everyday human thought and reasoning.

A new view of metaphor that challenged all these aspects of the powerful traditional theory in a coherent and systematic way was first developed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in 1980 in their seminal study: *Metaphors We Live By*. Their conception has become known as the "cognitive linguistic view of metaphor." Lakoff and Johnson challenged the deeply entrenched view of metaphor by claiming that (1) metaphor is a property of concepts, and not of words; (2) the function of metaphor is to better understand certain concepts, and not just some artistic or esthetic purpose; (3) metaphor is often *not* based on similarity; (4) metaphor is used effortlessly in everyday life by ordinary people, not just by special talented people; and (5) metaphor, far from being a superfluous though pleasing linguistic ornament, is an inevitable process of human thought and reasoning.

Lakoff and Johnson showed convincingly that metaphor is pervasive both in thought and everyday language. Their insight has been taken up by recent dictionary preparers as well. For instance, *Cobuild's Metaphor Dictionary* has examples of metaphors, such as the following (metaphorical expressions in the example sentences or phrases are italicized):

(1) He was an *animal* on Saturday afternoon and is a disgrace to British football.
(2) There is no painless way to get inflation down. We now have an excellent *foundation on which to build.*
(3) Politicians are being blamed for the *ills* of society.
(4) The *machinery* of democracy could be *created* quickly but its spirit was just as important.
(5) Government grants have enabled a number of the top names in British sport *to build* a successful career.
(6) . . . a local *branch* of this organization.
(7) Few of them have the qualifications . . . *to put an ailing* company *back on its feet.*
(8) The Service will continue *to stagger from* crisis *to* crisis.
(9) Her career was *in ruins*.
(10) How could any man ever understand the *workings* of a woman's mind?
(11) Scientists *have taken a big step* in understanding Alzheimer's disease.
(12) They selectively *pruned* the workforce.
(13) . . . *cultivating* business relationships that can lead to major accounts.
(14) The coffee was perfect and by the time I was halfway through my first cup my brain *was ticking over much more briskly.*
(15) Let's hope he can *keep* the team *on the road to* success.
(16) Everyone says what a happy, *sunny* girl she was.

(17) It's going to be a *bitch* to replace him.
(18) The province is quite close to *sliding into* civil war.
(19) They remembered her as she'd been *in the flower* of their friendship.
(20) Vincent met his father's *icy* stare evenly.
(21) With its economy *in ruins*, it can't afford to involve itself in military action.
(22) . . . French sex *kitten* Brigitte Bardot.

Some of these examples would be considered by most people to be obvious cases of metaphor, while some of them would perhaps be considered less obvious. Nevertheless, it can be claimed that most of the metaphorical linguistic expressions above are not literary and that most of them are not intended to exhibit some kind of rhetorical flourish. Indeed, most of them are so mundane that a very commonly heard charge can be leveled at them—namely, that they are simply "dead" metaphors—metaphors that may have been alive and vigorous at some point but have become so conventional and commonplace with constant use that by now they have lost their vigor and have ceased to be metaphors at all (such as 6 and 13).

The "dead metaphor" account misses an important point; namely, that what is deeply entrenched, hardly noticed, and thus effortlessly used is most active in our thought. The metaphors above may be highly conventional and effortlessly used, but this does not mean that they have lost their vigor in thought and that they are dead. On the contrary, they are "alive" in the most important sense—they govern our thought—they are "metaphors we live by." One example of this involves our comprehension of the mind as a machine. In the list above, two sentences reflect this way of thinking about the mind:

(10) How could any man ever understand the *workings* of a woman's mind?
(14) The coffee was perfect and by the time I was halfway through my first cup my brain *was ticking over much more briskly.*

We think of the mind as a machine. Both lay people and scientists employ this way of understanding the mind. The scientists of today use the most sophisticated machine available as their model—the computer. Lakoff and Johnson call this way of understanding the mind THE MIND IS A MACHINE metaphor. In their view, metaphor is not simply a matter of words or linguistic expressions but of concepts, of thinking of one thing in terms of another. In the examples, two very different linguistic expressions capture aspects of the same concept, the mind, through another concept, machines. In the cognitive linguistic view as developed by Lakoff and Johnson, metaphor is conceptual in nature. In this view, metaphor ceases to be the sole device of creative literary imagination; it becomes a valuable cognitive tool without which neither poets nor you and I as ordinary people could live.

This discussion is not intended to suggest that the ideas mentioned above in what we call the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor did not exist before

1980. Obviously, many of them did. Key components of the cognitive theory were proposed by a diverse range of scholars in the past two thousand years. For example, the idea of the conceptual nature of metaphor was discussed by a number of philosophers, including Locke and Kant, several centuries ago. What is new, then, in the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor? Overall, what is new is that it is a comprehensive, generalized, and empirically tested theory.

First, its comprehensiveness derives from the fact that it discusses a large number of issues connected with metaphor. These include the systematicity of metaphor; the relationship between metaphor and other tropes; the universality and culture-specificness of metaphor; the application of metaphor theory to a range of different kinds of discourse such as literature; the acquisition of metaphor; the teaching of metaphor in foreign language teaching; the nonlinguistic realization of metaphor in a variety of areas such as advertisements; and many others. It is not claimed that these issues have not been dealt with at all in other approaches; instead, the claim is that not all of them have been dealt with within the same theory.

Second, the generalized nature of the theory derives from the fact that it attempts to connect what we know about conceptual metaphor with what we know about the working of language, the working of the human conceptual system, and the working of culture. The cognitive linguistic view of metaphor can provide new insights into how certain linguistic phenomena work, such as polysemy and the development of meaning. It can also shed new light on how metaphorical meaning emerges. It challenges the traditional view that metaphorical language and thought is arbitrary and unmotivated. And offers the new view that both metaphorical language and thought arise from the basic bodily (sensorimotor) experience of human beings. As it turns out, this notion of "embodiment" very clearly sets off the cognitive linguistic view from the traditional ones.

Third, it is an empirically tested theory in that researchers have used a variety of experiments to test the validity of the major claims of the theory. These experiments have shown that the cognitive view of metaphor is a psychologically viable one, that is, it has psychological reality. Further experiments have shown that, because of its psychological reality, it can be seen as a key instrument not only in producing new words and expressions but also in organizing human thought, and that it may also have useful practical applications, for example, in foreign language teaching. I will try to deal with most of these topics in this book, although as can be expected from a book of this sort, I will only be able to offer a glimpse of them.

Up until most recently, metaphor has been primarily studied by philosophers, rhetoricians, literary critics, psychologists, and linguists, such as Aristotle, Hume, Locke, Vico, Herder, Cassirer, Buhler, I. A. Richards, Whorf, Goodman, Max Black, to mention just a few names from the thousands of people who have done work on metaphor over the past two thousand years. Today, an increasing number of cognitive scientists, including cognitive linguists, engage in the research on metaphor. The reason is that metaphor plays

a role in human thought, understanding, and reasoning and, beyond that, in the creation of our social, cultural, and psychological reality. Trying to understand metaphor, then, means attempting to understand a vital part of who we are and what kind of world we live in.

Lakoff and Johnson initiated this new study of metaphor over twenty years ago. In fact, it was their work that has defined in part cognitive linguistics itself as we know it today. Many scholars from a variety of disciplines have since contributed to this work over the years and have produced new and important results in the study of metaphor. What has exactly happened in the past two decades in the cognitive linguistic study of metaphor? This is what this book is about.

FURTHER READING

If you want to read up on the background to the study of metaphor, in general, including some of the scholars mentioned above, the best available collection of essays is Andrew Ortony (ed.), *Metaphor and Thought* (1993), second edition. What makes this volume especially important reading is that it contains several essays that represent rival views to the cognitive linguistic one. This is also the time to begin to read George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's *Metaphors We Live By*, the work that "started it all." An excellent survey of the view of metaphor developed by Lakoff and Johnson and others is Ray Gibbs (1994). This work also discusses a great deal of psychological evidence supporting the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor. Jäkel (1999) provides a useful survey of the most important predecessors of the cognitive linguistic view. If you are interested in the history of the study of metaphor, you should look at Mark Johnson's (1981) *Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor*. The most recent representative collection of papers in the cognitive spirit is the volume edited by Gibbs and Steen (1999). The metaphor dictionary referred to above is *Cobuild English Guides, 7: Metaphor* (1995).

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But, as always, the most beautiful metaphors came from Lacó and Ádi.

Budapest   Z. K.
October, 2000

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Contents

METAPHOR

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1

What Is
Metaphor?

Consider the way native speakers of English often talk about life—either their own lives or those of others:

> People might say that they try to give their children an education so they will get a good start in life. If their children act out, they hope that they are just going through a stage and that they will get over it. Parents hope that their children won't be burdened with financial worries or ill health and, if they face such difficulties, that they will be able to overcome them. Parents hope that their children will have a long life span and that they will go far in life. But they also know that their children, as all mortals, will reach the end of the road. (based on Winter, 1995, p. 235)

This way of speaking about life would be regarded by most speakers of English as normal and natural for everyday purposes. The use of phrases such as *to get a good start*, *to go through a stage*, *to get over something*, *to be burdened*, *to overcome something*, *a long life span*, *to go far in life*, *to reach the end of the road*, and so on would not count as using particularly picturesque or literary language. Below is a list of additional phrases that speakers of English use to talk about the concept of life:

> He's *without direction* in life.
> I'm *where I want to be* in life.
> I'm *at a crossroads* in my life.
> She'll *go places* in life.
> He's never *let* anyone *get in his way*.
> She's *gone through* a lot in life.

Given all these examples, we can see that a large part of the way we speak about life in English derives from the way we speak about journeys. In light of such examples, it seems that speakers of English make extensive use of the

domain of journey to think about the highly abstract and elusive concept of life. The question is: Why do they draw so heavily on the domain of journey in their effort to comprehend life? Cognitive linguists suggest that they do so because thinking about the abstract concept of life is facilitated by the more concrete concept of journey.

1. Conceptual Metaphor

In the cognitive linguistic view, metaphor is defined as understanding one conceptual domain in terms of another conceptual domain. (The issue of precisely what is meant by "understanding" will be discussed in section 3.) Examples of this include when we talk and think about life in terms of journeys, about arguments in terms of war, about love also in terms of journeys, about theories in terms of buildings, about ideas in terms of food, about social organizations in terms of plants, and many others. A convenient shorthand way of capturing this view of metaphor is the following: CONCEPTUAL DOMAIN (A) IS CONCEPTUAL DOMAIN (B), which is what is called a **conceptual metaphor**. A conceptual metaphor consists of two conceptual domains, in which one domain is understood in terms of another. A conceptual domain is any coherent organization of experience. Thus, for example, we have coherently organized knowledge about journeys that we rely on in understanding life. We will discuss the nature of this knowledge below.

We thus need to distinguish conceptual metaphor from **metaphorical linguistic expressions**. The latter are words or other linguistic expressions that come from the language or terminology of the more concrete conceptual domain (i.e., domain B). Thus, all the expressions above that have to do with life and that come from the domain of journey are linguistic metaphorical expressions, whereas the corresponding conceptual metaphor that they make manifest is LIFE IS A JOURNEY. The use of small capital letters indicates that the particular wording does not occur in language as such, but it underlies conceptually all the metaphorical expressions listed underneath it.

The two domains that participate in conceptual metaphor have special names. The conceptual domain from which we draw metaphorical expressions to understand another conceptual domain is called **source domain**, while the conceptual domain that is understood this way is the **target domain**. Thus, life, arguments, love, theory, ideas, social organizations, and others are target domains, while journeys, war, buildings, food, plants, and others are source domains. The target domain is the domain that we try to understand through the use of the source domain.

2. Some Examples of Conceptual Metaphor

To see that we do indeed talk about these target domains by making use of such source domains as war, journey, food, let us consider some classic ex-

amples of each from Lakoff and Johnson's *Metaphors We Live By*. Following the conventions of cognitive linguistics, I will use small capitals for the statement of conceptual metaphors and italics for metaphorical linguistic expressions.

AN ARGUMENT IS WAR
Your claims are *indefensible*.
He *attacked every weak point* in my argument.
His criticisms were *right on target*.
I *demolished* his argument.
I've never *won* an argument with him.
You disagree? Okay, *shoot!*
If you use that *strategy,* he'll *wipe* you *out*.
He *shot down* all of my arguments.

LOVE IS A JOURNEY
Look *how far* we've *come*.
We're *at a crossroads*.
We'll just have to *go our separate ways*.
We can't *turn back* now.
I don't think this relationship is *going anywhere*.
Where are we?
We're *stuck*.
It's been a *long, bumpy road*.
This relationship is a *dead-end street*.
We're just *spinning our wheels*.
Our marriage is *on the rocks*.
We've *gotten off the track*.
This relationship is *foundering*.

THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS
Is that the *foundation* for your theory?
The theory needs more *support*.
We need *to construct* a *strong* argument for that.
We need *to buttress* the theory with *solid* arguments.
The theory will *stand or fall* on the *strength* of that argument.
So far we have *put together* only the *framework* of the theory.

IDEAS ARE FOOD
All this paper has in it are *raw* facts, *half-baked* ideas, and *warmed-over* theories.
There are too many facts here for me *to digest* them all.
I just can't *swallow* that claim.
Let me *stew* over that for a while.
That's *food* for thought.
She *devoured* the book.
Let's let that idea *simmer on the back burner* for a while.

This is just a small sample of all the possible linguistic expressions that speakers of English commonly and conventionally employ to talk about the target domains above. We can state the nature of the relationship between

the conceptual metaphors and the metaphorical linguistic expressions in the following way: the linguistic expressions (i.e., ways of talking) make explicit, or are manifestations of, the conceptual metaphors (i.e., ways of thinking). To put the same thing differently, it is the metaphorical linguistic expressions that reveal the existence of the conceptual metaphors. The terminology of a source domain that is utilized in the metaphorical process is one kind of evidence for the existence of conceptual metaphor. But it is not the only kind, and we will survey other kinds of evidence in later chapters.

An important generalization that emerges from these conceptual metaphors is that conceptual metaphors typically employ a more abstract concept as target and a more concrete or physical concept as their source. Argument, love, idea, social organization are all more abstract concepts than war, journey, food, and plant. This generalization makes intuitive sense. If we want to better understand a concept, we are better off using another concept that is more concrete, physical, or tangible than the former for this purpose. Our experiences with the physical world serve as a natural and logical foundation for the comprehension of more abstract domains. This explains why in most cases of everyday metaphors the source and target domains are not reversible. For example, we do not talk about ideas as food or journey as love. This is called the principle of **unidirectionality**; that is, the metaphorical process typically goes from the more concrete to the more abstract but not the other way around.

3. Conceptual Metaphor as a Set of Mappings

So far we have used the word "to understand" to characterize the relationship between two concepts (A and B) in the metaphorical process. But what does it mean exactly that A is understood in terms of B? The answer is that there is a set of systematic **correspondences** between the source and the target in the sense that constituent conceptual elements of B correspond to constituent elements of A. Technically, these conceptual correspondences are often referred to as **mappings**.

Let us look at some cases where elements of the source domain are mapped onto elements of the target domain. Let's take the LOVE IS A JOURNEY conceptual metaphor first. When we use the sentence *We aren't going anywhere*, the expression *go somewhere* indicates traveling to a destination, in this particular sentence, a journey which has no clear destination. The word *we* obviously refers to the travelers involved. This sentence then gives us three constituent elements of journeys: the travelers, the travel or the journey as such, and the destination. However, when we hear this sentence in the appropriate context, we will interpret it to be about love, and we will know that the speaker of the sentence has in mind not real travelers but lovers, not a physical journey but the events in a love relationship, and not a physical destination at the end of the journey but the goal(s) of the love relationship. The sentence

The relationship is foundering suggests that somehow relationships are conceptually equated with the vehicles used in journeys. The sentence *It's been a bumpy road* is not about the physical obstacles on the way but about the difficulties that the lovers experience in their relationship. Furthermore, talking about love, the speaker of *We've made a lot of headway* will mean that a great deal of progress has been made in the relationship, and not that the travelers traveled far. And the sentence *We're at a crossroads* will mean that choices have to be made in the relationship, and not that a traveler has to decide which way to go at a fork in the road.

Given these interpretations, we can lay out a set of correspondences, or mappings between constituent elements of the source and those of the target. (In giving the correspondences, or mappings, we reverse the target-source order of the conceptual metaphors to yield source-target. We adopt this convention to emphasize the point that understanding typically goes from the more concrete to the more abstract concept.)

Source: JOURNEY		*Target*: LOVE
the travelers	⇒	the lovers
the vehicle	⇒	the love relationship itself
the journey	⇒	events in the relationship
the distance covered	⇒	the progress made
the obstacles encountered	⇒	the difficulties experienced
decisions about which way to go	⇒	choices about what to do
the destination of the journey	⇒	the goal(s) of the relationship

This is the systematic set of correspondences, or mappings, that characterize the LOVE IS A JOURNEY conceptual metaphor. Constituent elements of conceptual domain A are in systematic correspondence with constituent elements of conceptual domain B. From this discussion it might seem that the elements in the target domain have been there all along and that people came up with this metaphor because there were preexisting similarities between the elements in the two domains. This is not so. The domain of love did not have these elements *before it was structured* by the domain of journey. It was the application of the journey domain to the love domain that provided the concept of love with this particular structure or set of elements. In a way, it was the concept of journey that "created" the concept of love. To see that this is so, try to do a thought experiment. Try to imagine the goal, choice, difficulty, progress, etc. aspects of love without making use of the journey domain. Can you think of the goal of a love relationship without at the same time thinking of trying to reach a destination at the end of a journey? Can you think of the progress made in a love relationship without at the same time imagining the distance covered in a journey? Can you think of the choices made in a love relationship without thinking of choosing a direction in a journey? The difficulty of doing this shows that the target of love is not structured independently of and prior to the domain of journey. Another piece of evidence

for the view that the target of love is not structured independently of any source domains is the following. In talking about the elements that structure a target domain, it is often difficult to name the elements without recourse to the language of the source. In the present example, we talk about the *goals* associated with love, but this is just a slightly "disguised" way of talking about destinations given in the source; the word *goal* has an additional literal or physical use—not just a metaphorical one. In the same way, the word *progress* also has a literal or physical meaning and it comes from a word meaning "step, go." These examples show that many elements of target concepts come from source domains and are not preexisting.

We can now consider another example of how correspondences, or mappings, make up a conceptual metaphor.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE PLANTS
He works for the local *branch* of the bank.
Our company is *growing*.
They had to *prune* the workforce.
The organization was *rooted* in the old church.
There is now a *flourishing* black market in software there.
His business *blossomed* when the railways put his establishment within reach of the big city.
Employers *reaped* enormous benefits from cheap foreign labour.

This seems to be characterized by the following set of mappings:

Source: PLANT		*Target*: SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
(a) the whole plant	⇒	the entire organization
(b) a part of the plant	⇒	a part of the organization
(c) growth of the plant	⇒	development of the organization
(d) removing a part of the plant	⇒	reducing the organization
(e) the root of the plant	⇒	the origin of the organization
(f) the flowering	⇒	the best stage, the most successful stage
(g) the fruits or crops	⇒	the beneficial consequences

Notice that in this case as well, constituent elements of plants correspond systematically to constituent elements of social organizations, such as companies, and the words that are used about plants are employed systematically in connection with organizations. This correspondence can be seen in all of the mappings, except mapping (a), which is merely assumed by the sentence: "He works for the local *branch* of the bank." The mappings (indicated by the letters used above) and the matching expressions that make them manifest in the PLANTS metaphor are listed below:

(b) *branch*
(c) *is growing*
(d) *prune*
(e) *root*

(f) *blossom, flower*
(g) *fruits*

In light of the discussion so far, we can ask: What does it mean then to know a metaphor? It means to know the systematic mappings between a source and a target. It is not suggested that this happens in a conscious manner. This knowledge is largely unconscious, and it is only for the purposes of analysis that we bring the mappings into awareness. However, when we know a conceptual metaphor, we use the linguistic expressions that reflect it in such a way that we do not violate the mappings that are conventionally fixed for the linguistic community. In other words, not any element of B can be mapped onto any element of A. The linguistic expressions used metaphorically must conform to established mappings, or correspondences, between the source and the target.

4. The Importance of Metaphor

But how important is metaphor in our lives and how important is it to study? One of the best (but not quite serious) illustrations of the seriousness and importance of metaphor can be found in the myth of Oedipus. As part of the myth, Oedipus arrives in Thebes where he finds that a monster, called the Sphinx, is guarding the road to the city. She poses riddles to everyone on their way to Thebes and devours them if they are unable to solve the riddles. So far, everyone has been devoured when Oedipus arrives. The Sphinx asks him the riddle: Which is the animal that has four feet in the morning, two at midday, and three in the evening? Without hesitation Oedipus answers: Man, who in infancy crawls on all fours, who walks upright in maturity, and in his old age supports himself with a stick. The Sphinx is defeated and kills herself. Oedipus thus becomes the king of Thebes. How was Oedipus able to solve the riddle? At least a part of this must have been his knowledge of conceptual metaphor. There appear to be two metaphors operative in figuring out the riddle. The first is the metaphor THE LIFE OF HUMAN BEINGS IS A DAY. Oedipus must have been helped by the correspondences that obtain between the target concept of life and the source domain of day. Morning corresponds to infancy, midday to mature adulthood, and evening to old age. Since he knew these mappings, he offered the correct solution. Another, and maybe less important, metaphor that may have played a part is HUMAN LIFE IS A JOURNEY. This metaphor is evoked by the frequent mention and thus the important role of feet in the riddle. Feet evoke the concept of journey that may provide a clue to the successful solution of the riddle through the HUMAN LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor. This reading is reinforced by the fact that much of the myth is a tale of Oedipus's life in the form of a journey.

All in all, Oedipus's life, at least on this occasion, is saved in part by his knowledge of metaphor. Can there be a more important reason and better motivation to find out about metaphor?

5. Some Questions about Metaphor

Given this characterization of metaphor in cognitive linguistics, several important questions arise. The answers to these questions will make up much of the rest of this book. They include the following.

(1) *Common source and target domains.* If we want to get a good idea of the range of conceptual metaphors in English, we have to ask three specific questions: (a) What are the most common abstract targets in English? That is, given the many abstract domains, do all of them require an equal amount of metaphorical understanding? (b) What are the most common source concepts? That is, given the large number of potential source domains from the physical world, do all of them participate in metaphorical understanding to the same degree? and (c) Which sources are used to understand which targets? That is, given the most common targets and sources, is it the case that any source can be used to comprehend any target? These issues will be discussed in chapter 2.

(2) *Kinds of metaphor.* Are all conceptual metaphors like the ones we have dealt with so far? It will be shown that there are distinct kinds within the larger category of conceptual metaphor and that it is possible to classify metaphors in a variety of ways. The characterization of the distinct classes will enable us to see the subtle differences in the nature, function, and power of metaphor. This will be the topic of chapter 3.

(3) *Metaphor in literature.* The language of literature is often metaphorical. What can the view of metaphor as presented here contribute to the study of literature? Indeed, what is the relationship between everyday metaphor and metaphor used in literature? This issue will be discussed in chapter 4.

(4) *Nonlinguistic realizations of conceptual metaphors.* It was mentioned above that we use primarily linguistic evidence for the existence of conceptual metaphors. But there are other kinds of available evidence as well. Conceptual metaphors manifest themselves, or are realized, in ways other than linguistic. What then are the most common ways in which conceptual metaphors are realized in a culture? I will try to provide an answer in chapter 5.

(5) *The basis of metaphor.* It was pointed out that there is a potentially vast range of target and an equally huge range of source domains. If any source domain could be paired with any target domain, we would have completely arbitrary conceptual metaphors. However, this does not seem to be the case. Only some connections or pairings between sources and targets are acceptable. This indicates that there are certain limitations on what can become conceptual metaphors. What are the limitations that possibly motivate metaphorical links between A and B? I will take up this issue in chapter 6.

(6) *Partial mappings.* It was claimed that conceptual metaphors can be characterized by the formula A IS B. This would assume that an entire target domain would be understood in terms of an entire

source domain. This obviously cannot be the case because it would mean that one conceptual domain would be exactly the same as another. I will show that mappings can be, and are, only partial. Only a part of B is mapped onto a part of A. We need to ask which parts of the source are mapped onto which parts in the target. The issue is addressed in chapter 7.

(7) *Metaphorical entailments.* We have seen above that conceptual metaphor consists of a set of mappings between a source and a target. Given the rich knowledge we have about concrete source domains, how much and what knowledge is carried over from source B to target A? In other words, to what extent do we make use of this rich knowledge about sources beyond the basic constituent elements as discussed in the mappings above? Why isn't everything carried over from B to A? What determines what is not carried over? An explanation will be offered in chapter 8.

(8) *The scope of metaphor.* Most of the specific source domains appear to characterize not just one target concept but several. For instance, the concept of war applies not only to arguments but also to love, the concept of building not only to theories but also to societies, the concept of fire not only to love but also to anger, etc. What is the scope of metaphorical source domains and what determines it? We will deal with the issue in chapter 9.

(9) *Metaphor systems.* Some conceptual metaphors appear to cluster together to form larger subsystems of metaphor. Do we have any idea what some of these larger subsystems are? What might the overarching metaphorical system of English look like? I will describe systems of metaphor in chapter 10.

(10) *Another figure: metonymy.* Metaphor is closely related to several other "tropes"; most important, to metonymy. What are the similarities between them and how do they differ from each other? I will try to characterize the relationship between metaphor and metonymy in chapter 11.

(11) *The universality of conceptual metaphors.* Some conceptual metaphors appear to be at least near-universal. What can possibly determine the universality of these metaphors? The issue is raised and answered in chapter 12.

(12) *Cultural variation in metaphor.* Other metaphors tend to be culture-specific. Indeed, what kind of variation is there in metaphor? In addition to varying cross-culturally, do they also vary subculturally, individually, geographically? I will offer some tentative answers to these questions in chapter 13.

(13) *Idioms and metaphor.* One aspect of language where metaphor figures prominently is idioms. Idioms are often metaphorical. How can we characterize the relationship between idioms and metaphor on the basis of the cognitive linguistic view? I will address the issue in chapter 14.

(14) *Metaphor in the study of language.* But metaphor is important not only in idioms but also in many other areas of the study of language. What can linguistics gain from the cognitive approach to metaphor? I will discuss some examples of the usefulness of

the cognitive view of metaphor in the study of language in chapter 15.

(15) *Blending and metaphor*. The cognitive view of metaphor is not a closed system of ideas. There are some recent developments that add to, enhance, and complement this system. One of the most significant of these is the theory of "network models." This new development will be the topic of chapter 16.

These are some of the issues that we have to focus on if we wish to understand the metaphorical process in some of its complexity. I will return to these issues in subsequent chapters of this book.

SUMMARY

We have made a distinction between **conceptual metaphors** and **metaphorical linguistic expressions**. In conceptual metaphors, one domain of experience is used to understand another domain of experience. The metaphorical linguistic expressions make manifest particular conceptual metaphors. The conceptual domain that we try to understand is called the **target domain** and the conceptual domain that we use for this purpose is the **source domain**.

Understanding one domain in terms of another involves a set of fixed **correspondences** (technically called **mappings**) between a source and a target domain. This set of mappings obtains between basic constituent elements of the source domain and basic constituent elements of the target. To know a conceptual metaphor is to know the set of mappings that applies to a given source-target pairing. It is these mappings that provide much of the meaning of the metaphorical linguistic expressions (or linguistic metaphors) that make a particular conceptual metaphor manifest.

There are several issues that arise in connection with this view of metaphor. The answers to these issues will be discussed in subsequent chapters of the book.

FURTHER READING

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) introduce the notion of conceptual metaphor. Their book contains many of the conceptual metaphors discussed in the chapter, as well as more linguistic examples for these metaphors. Lakoff (1993) is a survey of a more sophisticated later version of the cognitive linguistic view. The idea that conceptual metaphor is constituted by a set of mappings between a source and a target domain is discussed primarily on the basis of the same paper by Lakoff. The LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor is discussed by Lakoff (1994) and Winter (1995). Helpful comments on correspondences, or mappings, can be found in Lakoff and Kövecses (1987).

Gerard Steen (1999) offers an "identification procedure" for metaphorical expressions. Several authors deal with the issue of metaphor identification and the research of metaphor in general in a volume edited by Cameron and Low (1999).

Criticisms of the early forms of the cognitive view of metaphor can be found in Holland (1982), Ortony (1988), and Wierzbicka (1986).

EXERCISES

1. Match the corresponding constituent elements of the source (indicated by numbers) and the target domains (indicated by letters) in the LOVE IS WAR metaphor. In other words, what are the mappings?

   1. the battles in the war
   2. the belligerents in the war
   3. the damage in the war to the belligerents
   4. the strategies for the war actions
   5. the victory of a belligerent
   6. to surrender to a belligerent

   (a) the damage in love to the lovers
   (b) to allow the partner to take control
   (c) the dominance of a partner
   (d) the events of the love relationship
   (e) the lovers in the love relationship
   (f) the plans for the love relationship

2. Which metaphor, i.e., which source domain and which target domain, can you recognize in the linguistic expressions *I'll take my chances*; *The odds are against me*; *I've got an ace up my sleeve*; *He's holding all the aces*; *It's a toss-up*?

3. What linguistic expressions can you collect as examples of the metaphor TIME IS MONEY?

4. What mappings characterize the THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS conceptual metaphor? With the help of the examples given in the chapter, lay out the set of correspondences, or mappings, between elements of the source and those of the target domains.