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Ghazali's Account Of Signification

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I. INTRODUCTION

Signification is a crucial subject in Islamic thought particularly in logic and methodology. Signification is primarily a subject of logic in all its details. In methodology, the subject is considered in terms of the signification of utterance to meaning in acknowledged sources for obtaining judgment. In logic and methodology, the subject of signification is certainly treated in different ways. However, this does not prevent signification from having common foundations in both sciences. Therefore, it is possible to compare the sciences of logic and methodology with respect to signification. This possibility implies a vast area. The present study will only attempt to compare "the ways in which meaning is signified by utterances" in logic and methodology based on Ghazali's (d.505/1111) ideas. Our choice of Ghazali could concisely be expressed in a few points. First, Ghazali occupies a prominent place in methodology. His prominence stems from the fact that his work *al-Mustasfâ* was a turning point in the systematization of methodology. Although we can talk about an established framework for the books on methodology compiled before Ghazali in general, the framework was not so much organized in itself.¹ This was also a source of complaint for Ghazali, who

¹ This lack of organization is observed about which subject should be dealt with where and how. It was a result of different ideas about the subject matter of methodology and can be regarded as normal in a sense because such periods are inevitable for all sciences in their process of formation and systematization. For a more detailed examination, see Cessâs (ö.370/980), *al-Fusûl*; Bâkîllânî (ö.403/1012), *al-Takrîb ve'l-Irshâd*; Debûsî (ö.430/1039), *Takvîmu'l-Edille*; Abu'l-Huseyn al-Basrî (ö.436/1044), *al-Mu'temed*; Ibn Hazm (ö.456/1063), *al-Ihkâm*; Imâmu'l-Harameyn al-Cuveynî (ö.473/1080), *al-Burhân*; Abu'l-Velîd al-Bâcî (ö.474/1081), *Ihkâmu'l-Fusûl*; Abû Ishâk al-Shîrâzî (ö.476/1083), *Sharhu'l-Luma'*.

expressed his criticisms on the point in his introduction of *al-Mustasfâ*.² Ghazali argues that before him, there was a convention in methodology literature of dragging out matters of Islamic theology (*kalam*) by Islamic theologians and matters of jurisprudence (*fiqh*) by jurists. This fact prevented methodology from attaining an organized structure in itself.

Criticizing his predecessors, Ghazali presents a highly systematized framework in *al-Mustasfâ* when compared to the books written before him. The book consists of an introduction and four chapters. The introduction entirely deals with issues in logic. Since he considered methodology as a theoretical science, Ghazali gave an outline for logic in his introduction to the book on methodology on account to the fact that logic should be regarded as a foundation for every theoretical science.

The four chapters following the introduction deal with the subjects of methodology. Ghazali divides the subject matter of methodology into four. The first part concerns sharia provisions. The second part examines the sources of sharia provisions, while the third part deals with the methods to obtain sharia provisions from sources. The fourth and last part is about the qualities of a person to obtain sharia provisions. Ghazali uses an analogy to explain this system. If we take methodology as the process of obtaining any product, then the product itself is (**semere**) sharia provision and the product's source is (**müsmir**) sharia source.³ The product is obtained from the source (**istismâr**) through ways of signification. Finally, the person to obtain the product is (**müstesmir**) a jurist.

This framework drawn by Ghazali fully encompasses the subjects of methodology. Before him, no such consistent system had been established and this framework has exerted great influence after Ghazali.

Another reason for preferring to study Ghazali in our work is his perspective on logic. Drawing upon the idea that "what one knows without the knowledge of logic is unreliable"⁴, Ghazali carried logic to a central point in Islamic sciences. By central, I mean logic is considered as the basis (of sciences). Ghazali has been much influential in this sense thereafter.⁵

² Abu Hamed Muhammad b. Muhammad al-Ghazali (d.505/1111), *al-Mustasfâ min Ilmi'l-Usûl*, Dâru'l-Erkam, Beirut (p.d), I/24,27.

³ For Ghazali, these sources of the Sharia include the Quran, Sunnah and *ijmâ* (consensus). For him, *qiyâs* (analogy) is not a source but a way to deduce provisions from the source, and thus, is a subject under matters on signification. So Ghazali's approach to *qiyâs* is highly important.

⁴ Ghazali, *al-Mustasfâ*, I/29.

⁵ A literature review on certain texts would be sufficient to see to what extent the science of logic developed after Ghazali. See Esîrûddîn al-Ebherî (d.663/1265), *Îsâgocî*; Necmeddîn al-Kazvîni (d.675/1276), *al-Risâletu's-Shamsiyye*; Sirâcuddîn al-Urmevî (d.682/1283), *Metâliu'l-Envâr*. On the other hand, that logic gained prominence with and through Ghazali

al-Mustasfâ is the last book on methodology written by Ghazali. He had written another one, *al-Manhûl*, when he was young; however, it is relatively weaker than *al-Mustasfâ* in terms of being systematic.⁶ Another distinguishing aspect of *al-Mustasfâ* from other works on methodology is that it summarizes the science of logic in its introduction. Such approach of Ghazali allows comparisons between logic and methodology on a single source.⁷ For all these reasons, we made Ghazali and *al-Mustasfâ* the basis of our study.

The paper first deals with the ways in which meaning is signified by utterances in the science of logic and proceeds through a discussion in terms of methodology and their comparison in the conclusion section.

II. THE WAYS IN WHICH MEANING IS SIGNIFIED BY UTTERANCE IN LOGIC

Ghazali is the first author to include an introduction about the science of logic in a book on methodology. In this sense, he is a notable scholar for consideration in comparisons between logic and methodology in any terms. Ghazali's introduction to *al-Mustasfâ* could be taken as an abridged version of what he discusses at length in his books on logic called *Mi'yâr al-Ilm* and *Mihakk al-Nazar*. He himself pointed to this fact by stating that he limited himself to providing only what could be useful in general.⁸ Yet, in a different vein, Ghazali included in his introduction remarks about why logic is important for methodology. It shall be helpful for our study to consider the remarks in question.

Ghazali uses the notion of **temhîd** in his introduction to *al-Mustasfâ*.⁹ Accordingly, this introduction on logic is regarded as a prelude to methodology. Nevertheless, Ghazali puts forward that logic is not simply a prelude peculiar to methodology. That is to say, Ghazali categorizes the science of methodology under rational sciences in his classification of sciences in his book. For him, logic is an introduction to every science falling under this category, for logic deals with the principles of reasoning. In this sense, Gha-

is a sufficient response to the claims that thought died with Ghazali. The proponents of such claim lack insight into the position of logic among Islamic sciences.

⁶ In the introduction to *al-Mustasfâ*, Ghazali tells about another book on methodology he compiled (I/15). We learn from here that this work called *Tehzîbu'l-Usûl* is more comprehensive than *al-Mustasfâ*. Unfortunately, the work is not available among the manuscripts in our libraries.

⁷ Most prominent sources of methodology compiled after Ghazali treated the subjects of logic in their introductions. See Fahreddîn al-Râzî (d.606/1210), *al-Mahsûl*; Seyfuddîn al-Âmidî (d.631/1234), *al-Ihkâm*; Ibn al-Hâcib (d.646/1248), *Muhtasar*; Ibnu's-Sâ'âtî (d.694/1294), *Bedîu'n-Nizâm*; Molla Fenârî (d.834/1430), *Fusûlu'l-Bedâyi*.

⁸ Ghazali, *al-Mustasfâ*, I/28.

⁹ Ghazali, *ibid*, I/16.

zali considers a person without any knowledge of logic as follows: “A person lacks insight into this science can never be trusted in his scholarly activities.”¹⁰ This remark by Ghazali reveals that methodology and logic bear a common ground in not only the context of signification, but beyond that, and this close relationship requires giving priority to logic. Following these elaborations, we can now examine how signification was treated in the introduction to *al-Mustasfâ*.

The introduction to *al-Mustasfâ* is divided into two, i.e. definition and comparison. Such division points out to the traditional distinction **tasavvurât** and **tasdikât** in classical logic.¹¹ Signification is discussed in the second part about analogy. Ghazali divided his chapter on analogy into three, which are prefixes, main subjects and suffixes. Signification is explained under prefixes, since analogy cannot be made without knowledge of the signification of meaning by utterance and the ways to such signification. This could be interpreted as follows: Analogy consists of certain judgments, and judgment consists of single words one including predicate and the other one about which predication is made (that is subject). Since words are utterances, how meaning is signified by words is important to understand them. Thus, signification is an introduction to analogy.

Ghazali did not define the concept of signification in his introduction. He treated the subject directly through his classification of the ways of signification. The author might have thought that the concept of signification is so self-evident that it did not need to be defined.¹² Thus, the lack of this definition in the book may not be taken as a deficiency.

There are three ways by which meaning is signified by utterance in the science of logic: Whole meaning signified by the utterance (**mutabakat**), a part of meaning signified by the utterance (**tazammun**) and a case in which the utterance signifies a meaning which is not included under but required by its own meaning (**iltizam**).¹³ In his introduction, Ghazali presented the same division, providing examples for each.¹⁴ For instance, the word “house” sig-

¹⁰ Ghazali, *ibid*, I/29.

¹¹ **Tasavvur** (envision) refers to the occurrence of a thing’s image in mind. **Tasdik** (confirmation) is attributing something to another in terms of affirmation and negation. Classical logic consists of two parts, one involving matters about **tasavvur** and the other examining matters about **tasdik**.

¹² Signification is usually defined as follows: “Signification refers to a case in which knowledge of one thing requires knowing another thing.” See Seyyid Sharîf al-Curcânî (ö.816/1413), *al-Ta’rifât*, Dâru’n-Nefâis, Beirut 2003, s.172.

¹³ For detailed information, see Kutbuddin al-Râzî (ö.766/1365), *Tahrîru’l-Kavâidi’l-Mantikiyye*, Intişârât-ı Bîdâr, Kum 1424, s.82-89.

¹⁴ Ghazali, *al-Mustasfâ*, I/77.

nifies the entirety of its assigned (**vaz**¹⁵) meaning through **mutabakat**. In such signification, there is a complete overlapping between the meaning signified by the utterance and the meaning assigned for the utterance. When the word “house” is used to signify roof, the utterance signifies the meaning “roof” by **tazammun**. Because roof is a part of the meaning assigned for the word “house”. Thus, “house” signifies a meaning as its part, not to a meaning beyond itself. Signification by **iltizam** could be exemplified by wall signified by the word “roof”. Wall is not a meaning included under the assigned meaning for the word “roof”. Yet, we necessarily think of the meaning wall when we think of the meaning of “roof”, since no roof can exist without walls. So there exists a relationship of necessity (**luzûm**) between the meanings of roof and wall. Hence, a case in which a word signifies a meaning that is necessary although it is out of its own meaning is called signification by **iltizam**.

Classification of the ways by which meaning is signified by utterance could be summarized as follows: an utterance either signifies a meaning it contains or signifies a meaning that it does not contain but it necessitates. The latter is called signification by **iltizam**. In the former, the utterance signifies either the entirety or a part of a meaning it contains. The second is signification by **tazammun** and the first is signification by **mutabakat**.

After classifying the ways of signification, Ghazali makes the following interpretation about signification by **iltizam**: “Avoid using utterances that signify by **iltizam** for reasoning! Instead, content yourself with utterances that signify by **mutabakat** and **tazammun**, for there is no limit to signification by **iltizam**. For instance, roof signifies wall; wall signifies the foundation; and foundation signifies the earth by **iltizam** and this cannot be limited.”¹⁶ The concept of “reasoning” is prominent in this interpretation by Ghazali. What Ghazali sought to clean off signification by **iltizam** is the field in which exact knowledge is sought. Since there is no limit to signification by **iltizam**, then one cannot possibly attain exact knowledge using it. Thus, signification by **iltizam** can only take one to conjectural (**zannî**) knowledge. Exact (**kat’î**) knowledge can only be attained either through signification by **mutabakat** or **tazammun**.

Ghazali treats analogy (*qiyas*) from this perspective when discussing the ways through which meaning is signified by utterance in methodology. We will discuss this later. However, assuming the existence of such relationship

¹⁵ Lexical meaning of “**vaz**” is “to put, place”. As a term, it refers to placing an utterance in a way to correspond to a meaning. For instance, the word “human” has placed to correspond to the meaning “a thinking living being”. For detailed information, see: Isâmuddîn Ibrâhîm b. Muhammed al-Isferâyînî (ö.951/1544), *Sharhu’r-Risâleti’l-Vad’iyye*, (m.y.), Istanbul 1280, p. 6.

¹⁶ Ghazali, *al-Mustasfâ*, 1/77.

in logic it might be useful to examine ‘analogy’ in the introduction to *al-Mustasfâ*.

In the introduction, analogy is discussed under “main subjects”. Ghazali defines analogy as follows: “generation of an outcome from two premises brought together under certain conditions”.¹⁷ In this discussion, analogy is divided into three in terms of the content of premises. If premises denote exact knowledge, they are termed as **burhân**; if they become so well-known to be used as arguments against an opponent in debate, then they are **cedelî**; and if they do not refer to any exact knowledge, one can talk about **fiqhî** analogy. This division by Ghazali demonstrates that analogy in logic and analogy in jurisprudence are distinguished from each other not in form, but in content. The difference in content was explained in terms of their denotation of exact knowledge. Since logical analogy and analogy in jurisprudence are different in their content, there should be congruence between them in terms of form. And this points out to the fact that the matter of signification as explained by Ghazali for jurisprudential analogy should correspond to something in logical analogy. Nevertheless, Ghazali did not include logical analogy into the ways by which meaning is signified by utterance, nor he did not separately discuss signification with respect to **burhân**. Still, at some point, Ghazali treated the concepts of **burhân** and signification together. At this point, Ghazali puts forward the following remark after arguing that the outcome necessarily comes to mind after the premises are confirmed by reason: “The signification aspect taking place in this form is summarized by the fact that a judgment that is valid for an attribute is also valid for that which is designated by that attribute.”¹⁸ An example could be useful for a better understanding of this remark.

One example for analogy given in the part on **burhân** is as follows: “All things consist of parts. All that consists of parts came into being afterwards. Then all things came into being afterwards.”¹⁹ Ghazali’s remark included the concepts of “attribute”, “designated thing” and “judgment”. If we take this example, attribute refers to the notion of “consisting of parts” which both premises contain. The valid judgment for attribute is coming into being afterwards. In addition, the designated thing is the concept of a thing. Consequently, as Ghazali points out, the judgment (coming into being afterwards) is valid for attribute (consisting of parts) as well as for the designated thing (object). That is how signification in analogy occurs. There is important question to be addressed here: So which category should signification in analogy be placed under the classification which is put forward for the ways through which meaning is signified by utterance? As we shall see further, in

¹⁷ Ghazali, *ibid.*, I/93.

¹⁸ Ghazali, *al-Mustasfâ*, I/96.

¹⁹ Ghazali, *ibid.*, I/93.

his answer to this question with respect to the science of methodology, Ghazali describes signification in analogy as signification through reason. As we said earlier, Ghazali also argues that logical analogy and jurisprudential analogy are parallel in their forms. Then, signification through reason should also apply to logical analogy. Yet, as we said before, Ghazali divides in three the ways through which meaning is signified by utterance in logic: **mutabakat**, **tazammun** and **iltizam**. There is no such thing as “signification through reason” among them. So we ask a second question: what place does signification through reason occupy among these three categories? That question is of great importance for our point. Though we find a clear answer to this question in Ghazali, one of the leading followers of Ghazali, Fahreddin al-Râzî (d.606/1209), clearly stated that signification by **tazammun** and **iltizam** are signification through reason.²⁰ Yet, another argument is also possible. The relationship between attribute and designated thing cannot be described either as a **mutabakat** or **tazammun** relationship. Because the meaning of attribute is neither the whole nor part of the meaning of the designated thing; yet, there exists a relationship of necessity between them. The designated thing requires that the meaning contained in the attribute also apply to itself. Then, it seems to be the most probable choice to consider the relationship between the designated things and attributes as signification by **iltizam**. Therefore, although we admit that our result is open to debate, the signification in analogy is arguably signification by **iltizam**.

On the other, what places our result under serious doubt is Ghazali’s recommendation not to use signification by **iltizam** for reasoning. Since Ghazali made logical analogy an indispensable part of reasoning, it is improbable that for him, analogy can overlap with signification by **iltizam**, which, as he argues, should be kept away from reasoning. Instead, analogy can be said to be signification by **tazammun** as there also exists a relationship of necessity in signification by **tazammun**. While in signification by **iltizam**, the word as a signifier necessitates a meaning other than its own, there is a need for a meaning contained under the word’s own meaning in signification by **tazammun**. Therefore, the relationship of necessity is common in both types of signification. One involves an external necessity, while the other involves an internal one.²¹ Thus, the relationship between analogy and signification by **tazammun** is a subject that requires a separate discussion.

In his introduction to *al-Mustasfâ*, Ghazali expressed the above comments about signification of meaning by utterance. To sum up, utterance signifies meaning in three ways: **mutabakat**, **tazammun** and **iltizam**. And there is also signification in the form of analogy, which we have concluded to refer

²⁰ Fahreddin al-Râzî, *al-Mahsûl*, Muessesetu’r-Risâle, Beirut 1997, I/219.

²¹ Muhammed b. Velî al-Izmîrî (ö.1165/1751), *Hâshiyetu Mir’âti’l-Usûl*, al-Hâc Muharrem Efendi Matbaası, Istanbul 1302, II/83.

to signification by **tazammun** or **iltizâm** although Ghazali did not provide any clear explanations. Now we can move on to the second part of the article dealing with the ways in which meaning is signified by utterances in terms of methodology.

III. THE WAYS IN WHICH MEANING IS SIGNIFIED IN METHODOLOGY

In his introduction, Ghazali first points out to the ways meaning is signified by utterances in terms of methodology. He uses various concepts for making different classifications using different utterances. His first classification divides the ways of signification into four, for each of which he uses the following concepts respectively: signification by the form of utterance, signification by the concept of utterance, signification by the context of utterance, and signification by the rational part of utterance, which refers to analogy.²² At another place, he makes a classification of three and uses the following concepts: signification of what is uttered, signification of the concept, and signification of what is reasoned.²³ Apart from these, he also applied a classification of four at two other points: signification of what is uttered, signification of the concept, signification of necessity, and signification of what is reasoned.²⁴ Though there are certain changes in utterances used, their meanings are close. Yet, as a significant difference, one classification divides the ways of signification into three and another divides them into four. We could conclude that the main one is the classification of four since it is used more commonly. Nevertheless, Ghazali used the classification of three in the part where he treated the subject. We have already mentioned that Ghazali divided his book into four chapters. The ways in which meaning is signified by utterance are discussed in chapter three, which is further divided into three. The first part is about signification of what is uttered. The second part concerns signification of concept. Signification of necessity, which he mentioned as a separate part in the introduction, was discussed under the title of signification of concept. Thus, the four ways of signification were reduced to three in their treatment. The third and last part discusses signification of what is reasoned. Ghazali devoted this whole chapter to analogy. And this shows that Ghazali refers to analogy by “signification of what is reasoned”. Following these remarks on different classifications in various parts of the book, we can now discuss the subject in detail.

Remembering Ghazali’s analogy of harvest, the method used to produce crops refers to the ways in which meaning is signified by utterance. Without

²² Ghazali, *al-Mustasfâ*, I/18.

²³ Ghazali, *ibid*, I/20.

²⁴ Ghazali, *ibid*, I/22, 25.

any knowledge about the ways in which meaning is signified by utterance, one cannot possibly deduce provisions from the sources on Sharia. Ghazali describes the chapter on the ways in which meaning is signified by utterance as the pillar of methodology.²⁵ Such treatment is because this chapter is the main subject of pursuit for methodology scholars. To explain this, Ghazali points out to the fact that a jurispudent is not an authority on provisions and sharia sources. Thus, what he can simply do in chapters about provisions and sharia sources is to accept them as they are. In these areas, there is no place for his jurisprudence. The number of provisions and sharia sources is certain. A jurispudent does not have a say in this field. On the other hand, in matters concerning the ways of signification, one totally relies on jurispudents' interpretations and jurisprudence. Therefore, the pillar of methodology concerns the ways in which meaning is signified by utterance.

As we said earlier, Ghazali divides the ways in which meaning is signified by utterance into three.²⁶ Ghazali divides signification into four parts in chapter one. The first part treats implicit (**mucmel**) and explicit (**mubeyyen**) utterances, the second part is about utterances that are open to interpretation (**zâhir**) and interpreted (**müevvel**), the third part concerns orders and prohibitions, and the fourth and last part is about public (**âmm**) and private (**hâss**) utterances. Ghazali also wrote an introduction for this chapter, in which he discusses the following: the origin of languages, the relationship between language and reasoning, customary names, useful utterance, ways to understand what is meant, metaphor and reality.

Ghazali did not further explain what he meant by signification of what is uttered. He directly started his discussion based on his classification. Yet, it is not hard to conclude that he meant by signification of what is uttered the meaning assigned for utterance. Accordingly, if the meaning signified by utterance is a meaning contained by the meaning of utterance itself and is directly understood from the utterance, here the utterance signifies its meaning in its own form.²⁷

Signification of implicit and explicit utterances, utterances that are open to interpretation and interpreted, and other kinds of utterances falls under the category of the signification of what is uttered; because signification of such utterances occurs according to the characteristics of utterances. In relation to our subject, we do not need to and will not go into detail for these kinds of utterances.

The second part concerns the signification of concept. Ghazali treated the subject under five titles: (1) signification of necessity, (2) signification of the

²⁵ Ghazali, *al-Mustasfâ*, I/657.

²⁶ Ghazali, *ibid*, I/658.

²⁷ Ghazali, *ibid.*, I/658.

sign, (3) understanding the reason for the existence of a provision from the attribute mentioned along with the provision, (4) signification by utterance of cases that are subject to one about which a provision was made and (5) signification by utterance of cases that are against the one about which a provision was made. As said earlier, Ghazali discussed in this part the signification of necessity and signification of the sign together. Now let us move onto these discussions.

In the signification of necessity, an utterance signifies a meaning it necessarily requires, not its literal meaning. Signification of necessity can only take place in three ways.

1. Such signification is necessary to exist so that one can judge that the utterer speaks the truth. For example, for the hadith “Mistakes and forgetfulness has been lifted from my ummah” to be true, the word “mistakes” should mean the sentence for mistakes. Because we know that, the ummah is not immune to mistakes and forgetfulness. Then, for this utterance to be true, the word “mistakes” should necessarily signify the sentence for mistakes. After all, this utterance signifies its own meaning by necessity.²⁸

2. Legal validity of an utterance depends on the presence of such signification. As an example, let us take the utterance “free your slave in my name” told by someone to another. For this utterance to be legally valid, the slave must have bought before by the demander. Thus, this utterance signifies that the slave had been bought before he was freed, which is a necessary signification.²⁹

3. The ability to envision an utterance depends on the rational existence of such signification. Surat an-Nisâ verse 23 says, “Forbidden to you are your mothers”. What is forbidden in this verse is to marry one’s mother. Therefore, the word “mother” in the verse signifies marrying mothers.³⁰

To sum up the signification of necessity, there is neither a direct nor an indirect relation between utterance and the meaning signified by the utterance. However, for the utterance to be meaningful, one needs a link between the utterance and the meaning it signifies. In this regard, signification of necessity is distinguished from both the signification of what is uttered and signification of the sign. For as we have already seen, the signification of what is uttered concerns the meaning directly understood from the utterance. In signification of the sign, on the other hand, there is a reference to the indirectly, though not directly, understood meaning from the utterance. However, there

²⁸ Ghazali, *al-Mustasfâ*, II/217.

²⁹ Ghazali, *ibid.*, II/218.

³⁰ Ghazali, *ibid.*, II/219.

is no direct link between the utterance and the signified meaning here, and what requires us to establish this link is simply a necessity.

Secondly, in this chapter, Ghazali discusses the signification of the sign, which is defined as follows: “It is signification of meaning understood from the sign of the utterance, not the utterance itself. What we mean by this is that the meaning that is not the aim of the utterance is understood from the utterance.”³¹ Ghazali makes an analogy to a case in which things other than those understood simply from a speaker’s utterance are understood from his behavior and attitude. Similarly, other meanings that are not understood from the utterance itself are sometimes attached to an utterance.

Surat al-Baqarah verse 187 says that prohibitions of fasting are removed until daylight. Thus, one is free to eat, drink and have sexual intercourse from fast break until sunrise. Although this is the meaning understood from the utterance of the verse, it is also understood from the sign of the verse that starting the day without *ghusl* will not damage fasting. If intercourse is allowed until daylight, then there is a possibility that one can start the day without *ghusl*. So signification of this provision by the verse is the signification of by an utterance a meaning that is not directly understood from the utterance itself, but from its sign.

Thirdly, Ghazali provides an example for understanding the reason for the existence of a provision from the attribute mentioned along with the provision.³² From Surat al-Mâide verse 38, which orders to cut off the hands of the man who steals and the woman who steals, one can also understand that stealing is a reason for this provision. Yet, this secondary meaning is not clearly expressed in the verse. The verse does not contain an explicit statement that “the reason for this provision is stealing” The reason for the provision is understood from the sign of the verse.

The difference between this kind of signification and the signification of the sign mentioned in the second part does not seem to be a big one. In the last analysis, the meaning signified by the utterance in both is a meaning that not uttered. Still, one can make such distinction between the two. The meaning understood in the signification of the sign is not used as an element in analogy, while the meaning concluded from this signification is used as an element of analogy. Yet, this difference stems from the state of what is signified. It is still possible to argue that there is not a great difference between the two in terms of being ways of signification.

The fourth type of signification concerns cases in which utterance is subject to one about which a provision was made. An example of such signification

³¹ Ghazali, *al-Mustasfâ*, II/220.

³² Ghazali, *ibid*, II/222.

is Surat al-Isra verse 23. Here there is a prohibition of saying disrespectful words to parents, which means not to persecute parents in any way. From this relation with meaning, we conclude from the verse that it is also forbidden to, say, beat one's parents because beating is a much more severe punishment for parents than simply saying disrespectful words. If the latter is prohibited, then the former is also prohibited.³³ Some call this "signification of a higher level by a lower level due to its relation with cause". Ghazali thinks it is possible, but does not deem it acceptable since for him, a lower level does not always signify a higher level if one does not know the purpose of an utterance. For instance, if one swears that "I will not spend one's property" but burns them, one cannot say he acted against his words; because his oath only concerned spending that person's property. So in this type of signification, one needs to maintain the relation between the utterance and the meaning as its cause and to realize signification on this basis.

Immediate There is a very close relationship between cases in which utterance is subject to one about which a provision was made and signification of the sign. Both signify a meaning that is not directly understood from the utterance itself. Yet, one can think of a difference between the two: in the first type of signification, the meaning stems from its relation to the cause of that utterance, while signification of the sign lacks this quality.

The fifth and last part is about signification by utterance of cases that are against the one about which a provision was made. Ghazali explained the essence of this method as follows: "does association of a provision with something's attribute signify that the provision does not apply to another thing against it with respect to this attribute?" It will be clearer if we answer this question using an example. Surat al-Maida verse 95 prohibits killing a game during pilgrimage. For whoever kills intentionally, the compensation will be offering the like of what he killed. A careful look will reveal that the verse's provision was made conditional to "doing intentionally". One can ask if only this particular verse signifies that the same compensation is not required for games killed unintentionally and by mistake.

Signification by utterance of cases that are against the one about which a provision was made has been one of the most debated matters in methodology books. Ghazali treated the subject in detail by going into all evidence put forward by those who consider this type of signification as legitimate and illegitimate. Ghazali's own position is that the mentioned attribute does not signify a case that is not mentioned.³⁴ In this context, Ghazali acted against Imam Shafi'i (d.204/820) and Imam Malik (d.179/795). We leave discussing this subject to another study since it is beyond the scope of the present study.

³³ Ghazali, *al-Mustasfā*, II/222.

³⁴ Ghazali, *al-Mustasfā*, II/224.

We have mentioned five types of signification in the part about signification of concept: signification of necessity, signification of the sign, signification of the reason for the provision, signification of cases that are subject to one about which a provision was made and signification of cases that are against the one about which a provision was made. Ghazali deemed all of these five methods as legitimate, except for signification of cases that are against the one about which a provision was made. We can classify those deemed as legitimate by Ghazali as follows: in signification of concept, utterance signifies or does not signify a meaning through necessity. The first is signification of necessity. The second either involves or does not involve signification of meaning through its relation to the meaning as the reason of the utterance. The first refers to signification of cases that are subject to one about which a provision was made. In the second one, the meaning signified by the utterance is either a meaning used in analogy or it is not. The first is signification of the reason for the provision, while the second is signification of the sign. In this classification, one can see that each has certain differences; yet, particularly treating signification of reason and signification of the sign separately was not a result of the characteristics of the ways of signification. Such distinction was made by considering what is signified, as we already said. Thereby, this classification can be reorganized in a better way.

Thus, we have examined the first part of the chapter on signification of meaning by utterance. We have already said that Ghazali mentioned analogy in the third part of this chapter. Now let us see how Ghazali treated analogy.

Ghazali discussed analogy through two introductions and four sections. One introduction defines analogy and the other discusses the jurisprudential methods for ‘*illa*’ (cause)³⁵. Jurisprudential methods for ‘*illa*’ are three: Identifying the existence of ‘*illa*’ in an element of analogy (**tahkîku’l-menât**), identifying what can be properly be ‘*illa*’ from among the characteristics of the element of analogy (**tenkîhu’l-menât**), identifying the ‘*illa*’ in matters for whose ‘*illa*’ is not explicit (**tahrîcu’l-menât**). The sections about analogy discusses the following: Proof for the existence of analogy, ways to identify ‘*illa*’, resemblance between the source of analogy and two different targets (**kıyâs-ı şebeh**), elements of analogy. Of interest for us is the first introduction defining analogy. Drawing upon the author’s remarks on analogy, we will attempt to reveal the connection between analogy and signification. For in relation to our subject, we are interested in the fact that analogy is regarded as a way of signification.

Analogy (*qiyas*) is defined in *al-Mustasfâ* as in the following: “Analogy refers to attributing one known thing to another known thing for inference

³⁵ ‘*illa*’ is the common characteristic of two things compared. It is also *raison d’être* of analogy.

through a positive or negative case that brings the two together.”³⁶ The seemingly complex definition could be explained as follows. As suggested by Ghazali, an analogy should contain four elements, which are target, source, ‘*illa* and inference. The definition is more comprehensible if we try to identify these elements of analogy in the definition. The two known things in the definition are the source and target. Thus, the source is attributed to the target in a certain case. What brings these two elements together is ‘*illa*. After these two elements are brought together by ‘*illa*, the source is attributed to the target with respect to the presence or absence of an inference. Inference is the point at which attribution is realized.

Let us make the definition clear using an example provided by Ghazali for jurisprudential *qiyās* (analogy). Ghazali’s example is as follows: “Date wine is intoxicant. All intoxicants are *haram*. Then date wine is *haram*.” This form of *qiyās* contains three elements of *qiyās*: The source, ‘*illa* and inference. The validity of this *qiyās* requires an external evidence, which is a proof that presents us the target and its inference. Without such external evidence, one cannot possibly attain the complete form of *qiyās*. Using the example, date wine is the source, “being intoxicant” is the ‘*illa* and “being *haram*” is the inference. Here, the external evidence is the verse forbidding grape wine as *haram*. We first have to know the external evidence to perform *qiyās*. Then we find the ‘*illa* for this provision. The Prophet (pbuh) said in a hadith “All intoxicants are *haram*”, which shows us that the ‘*illa* is being intoxicant. Then we have all the elements, and what is left is to identify the form of *qiyās*. From the intoxicant quality of date wine, we can infer the fact that it is also *haram* since being intoxicant is a reason for being *haram*. Consequently, following the example, we attribute the source (date wine) to the target (grape wine) based on an inference (being *haram*) through an ‘*illa* (being intoxicant).

Unfortunately, Ghazali failed to reveal clearly that why he considered analogy as a way of signification. Yet, it seems possible to arrive at an explanation from what he said. As could be understood from Ghazali’s definition of an example about jurisprudential *qiyās*, the reason for his considering *qiyās* as a way of signification is that jurisprudential *qiyās* also takes place in a form similar to logical analogy. Now, we cannot argue that logical analogy and jurisprudential *qiyās* are totally identical, for as Ghazali suggests, in order to form a jurisprudential *qiyās*, one needs an external evidence containing a target and its inference.³⁷ However, logical analogy lacks this aspect. Despite this minor difference, the two types of analogy overlap in terms of inference since them both have a form. Inference upon the form is entirely rational. Accordingly, an individual with knowledge on the form of

³⁶ Ghazali, *al-Mustasfā*, II/278.

³⁷ Ghazali, *al-Mustasfā*, I/93.

qiyâs will be able to arrive at the conclusion from the premises through rational signification, whatever the content of the *qiyâs*. That is why Ghazali regarded *qiyâs* as the signification of what is reasoned.

Ghazali also said the following to explain jurisprudential *qiyâs*: “Jurisprudential *qiyâs* relating one thing to another on the basis of identicalness.”³⁸ The two things meant by this are the source and the target. The point of identicalness at which the former is related to the latter is inference. The *raison d’être* for the inference is the *‘illa*, which is common in both. Therefore, the source and the target entirely overlap with regard to *‘illa* and inference, and it is this overlapping that is called *qiyâs*. This idea is confirmed by the position Ghazali mentioned in the introduction to his book. When evaluation jurisprudential *qiyâs* in his introduction to logic, he said the following about the essence of *qiyâs*: “to combine the particular with the general.”³⁹ Here, the particular concerns the source and the target, which are particular as they are for certain situations. The general is *‘illa*. Since these two particulars are combined under a general *‘illa*, an inference which is valid for one is also valid for the other. Thus, *qiyâs* takes place between the two.

IV. CONCLUSION and INTERPRETATION

For Ghazali, the least common denominator for the sciences of logic and methodology are that they are both theoretical sciences. In this sense, both sciences have common matters, one of which is signification. Both logic and methodology involve discussions about signification of meaning by utterances and the ways of such signification. At the beginning of the study, we started from the assumption that the perspectives of logic and methodology could coincide with regard to this subject. At the point of conclusion, we see that such overlapping is realized in general terms.

There are three ways of signification of meaning by utterance in the science of logic: **mutabakat**, **tazammun** and **iltizam**. The first two originate from the utterance itself. Signification by **iltizam**, on the other hand, refers to signification of a meaning to which the utterance is attached in terms of concept, not a meaning that is originally contained by the utterance. Thus, these three forms of signification are reduced to two in another sense: Signification of a meaning in the utterance itself, and signification of a meaning outside the utterance.

Excluding signification in analogy, there are two types of signification in the science of methodology: signification of the utterance, signification of the concept. As we said earlier, signification of the concept is further divided

³⁸ Ghazali, *ibid*, II/279.

³⁹ Ghazali, *ibid.*, I/94.

into four legitimate parts, which are signification of necessity, signification of the sign, signification of *'illa* and signification of cases that are subject to the one about which a provision was made. Consequently, signification in methodology is also divided into two main sections, which are signification of a meaning in the utterance itself, and signification of a meaning outside the utterance.

Signification of what is uttered in methodology corresponds to signification by **mutabakat** and **tazammun** in logic. With regard to the signification of what is not uttered, signification of concept in methodology corresponds to signification by **iltizam** in logic.

The subject of analogy is treated separately in two sciences. However, in methodology, Ghazali describes analogy as the signification of what is reasoned. Even though it is not clearly stated that analogy in logic is an independent way of signification, as we have said, Ghazali accepts the presence of a kind of signification in analogy, which is a rational signification. For when we think of analogy in both sciences in form, we see that there is a rational inference. If we abstract the form of analogy from its content, what remains is simply an inference required by reason. This rational inference is as follows: "All a's are b's. All b's are c's. Then all a's are c's." No matter what symbols are written in the inference, the conclusion will necessarily be the same, for it is what reason dictates. At this point, the difference between the overlapping logical and jurisprudential analogy takes place in the process of obtaining the form. While form is entirely depending on exact knowledge in logic, this is not the case for form in *fiqh*. As we stated earlier, Ghazali summarized that as follows: If the premises of an analogy express exact knowledge, the analogy is a logical one; while it is called a jurisprudential analogy if its premises do not express exact knowledge. As a result, analogy is regarded as a rational signification in both sciences.

We believe that our conclusions need further investigation in the literature on methodology, which Ghazali was influenced and was influenced by. The present study is preliminary in comparing logic and methodology with regard to the ways of signification. Thus, further studies on the period before and after Ghazali will either confirm the results of this study or allow us to obtain different results.

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