

Byzantine General Problem

Murat Osmanoglu

Permissionless Blockchain

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- Anyone can participate in the protocol and receive BTC as rewards by performing the PoW-based mining
- The mechanism of pouring currency in the system via PoW, that makes it feasible for anyone (possessing sufficient hashing power) to participate
- The ledger itself is public, readable, and writeable by anyone

Permissioned Blockchain

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can also be dynamic, i.e. the initial set of nodes agree on a specific set of rules to accept new players

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- Certificates need to be revoked in case that the corresponding secret keys become exposed

The Byzantine Generals Problem



The Byzantine Generals Problem



- several divisions of Byzantine army camped outside of an enemy city




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- several divisions of Byzantine army camped outside of an enemy city
- each of them commanded by a general




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
The Byzantine Generals Problem



- several divisions of Byzantine army camped outside of an enemy city
- each of them commanded by a general
- generals communicate through messengers
- they try to reach an agreement on a common plan (retreat or attack) while some of them may be traitors that sabotage this process

The Byzantine Generals Problem


The generals must develop an algorithm guaranteeing that




The Byzantine Generals Problem

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The Byzantine Generals Problem




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The Byzantine Generals Problem



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
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The algorithm guarantees this regardless of what the traitors do

- a small number cannot cause the loyal generals to adopt the wrong plan


The Byzantine Generals Problem

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
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traitors may send different messages to different generals




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


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
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
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
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
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


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How a single general sends his value to the others ?

The Byzantine Generals Problem

Definition

A general must send an order to his $n - 1$ lieutenant generals in a way that :




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
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Definition

A general must send an order to his $n - 1$ lieutenant generals in a way that :

- all loyal lieutenants obey the same order
- if the general is loyal, then every loyal lieutenant obeys the order he sends

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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- no solution can work in the presence of a single traitor if there are only three generals

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 - prevents a traitor from interfering with the communication between other two generals.

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
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- Lieutenant i computes the final decision as $\text{majority}(v(1), \dots, v(n-1))$


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
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


majority(v, v, x)


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
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


majority(x, y, z)

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the algorithm satisfies the conditions if there are more than $3m$ generals and at most m traitors

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