

**WINNING BACK RELIGION**  
**– COUNTERING the MISUSE of SCRIPTURE AGAINST**  
**TERRORISM–\***

**Prof.Dr. Şaban Ali DÜZGÜN**  
Theology Faculty of Ankara University  
[duzgun@ankara.edu.tr](mailto:duzgun@ankara.edu.tr)

***Abstract** Unlike Eastern religions, Western ones (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) have a normative nature. Reciting the scripture does not give its member just spiritual sense but creates norms for their daily life. They emphasize action, a performing the will of God. Many dos and don'ts of the scriptures are clear enough to see this normative character. These holy texts can't speak; however, their interpreters do on behalf of them. And they interpret them within an interpretive context that is geo-historically, geo-culturally and geo-politically rather different from one another. This is the reason why there are conflicts not just among those who believe and don't, but among the members of the same holy text, as well. Through out-of-context quotations some so-called devout members can easily distort the very meaning of the text, and thus transform it into a source of uproar and chaos rather than peace and serenity. Considering this historical experience, this paper puts a difference between the scripture and historical phenomena it has created and criticizes the essentialist approach that identifies the scripture with its members. Most importantly, the paper tries to show how some politically minded people transform a spiritual and practical guide first into an ideology then into a political capital. In this context the following titles will be dealt with: Islam of identity and Islam of truth; Subordination scripture to the jihadist politics: the position of Islamists and 'ulamā in contemporary Islam; para-mosque structures and transformation Islam into Islamism; neo-Orientalism, essentialism and contingencies about scripture and its relation to Muslims' behavior; jihad and associate terms; suicide bombings and their (un)justification.*

**Key Words:** *The Holy Scripture, Islam of identity and Islam of truth, political Islam, jihad, suicide bombings.*

**1. The Scripture and Its Contingent Interpretations: Islam versus Historical Phenomena of Islam**

The history of Islam is the history of interpretations. Much of what is known as Islam is in reality nothing more than its historically and culturally construed form. There is no one-on-one overlapping between Islam and its historical phenomena including this day and age. So, in order to figure out the current situation, three building blocks in a religious tradition (Islam in this case) are to

---

\* Nato toplantısında sunulan tebliğ, Kiev, Ukrayna 23-27 Mayıs 2011.

be analyzed: First, the scripture that constructs and produces a Muslim mind, secondly, the mind that interprets the scripture and thus creates a theological tradition and finally the actions that this mind has created throughout history which I called historical phenomena of Islam.

Without referring to the scripture, it is hardly reasonable to explain the mind and the actions or phenomena created by this mind but it is also not realistic to explain the mind and actions referring completely to the scripture. As the text is just one of the components that produces this mind and actions beside cultural and geographical milieu, to get an authentic evaluation all these factors have to be scrutinized together.

It is believed that to reveal the real character of Islam one has to read the Qur'an from beginning to the end. But this approach is not accurate. This is the case of 'essentialists' and 'apologetics', which is totally provocative and far from being a creative solution. Through this evaluation, many go far as to compare Qur'an to Hitler's *Meine Kampf*. So it is necessary to consider the emotional, situational and cultural context or 'brackets' while interpreting the Qur'an. These contexts are the reason behind the occurrence of multiple-meanings that traditional exegesis scholars suggested in several Qur'anic expressions. Just as it is wrong to justify one's wrongdoing with the scripture, so is trying to find a reference from the scripture to comprehend any Islamic act. The real context of any action is economic, sociological and anthropological more than scriptural.

We are at the heart of different geographical and cultural spaces where there operates not what is commonly called 'Islam' but *Islamic fact or phenomenon*. There is no unified Muslim world or Islam. Rather there have been Islam and Muslim (realities). The clash of civilization theorists grossly confuse this fact and erroneously reduce different realities or phenomena of Islam into a unified and implicit form of Islam. Considering Islam as a monolithic entity is a mistake. Even during the Golden age of Islam at the height of Abbasid period, there were rival caliphates in Cordoba and in North Africa as well as ethnically based Turkish and Iranian dynasties that challenged Bagdat's Abbasid caliphate authority. This kind of unified and unequivocal Islam is epistemic and historical absurdity. The same mistake is made by these theorists in their consideration other civilizations as unified like Indian civilization. India's Muslim population is greater than the combined population of Britain and France. There are also Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists. The southern part of India is totally Christian. How reasonable then to depict Islam and other religions and civilizations as unified and cohesive?!

Correspondingly, in apprehensive arguments, Islam, Islamism and jihadism are being conflated into one and the same phenomenon, both seeming to embody a threat to democratic values, or are seen to stand for terrorism. As long as Islam and Islamism or other forms or phenomena of Islam are not isolated from one another, a precise solution may be far from being grasped.

## **2. Islam of Identity and Islam of Truth**

Since the interpretive knowledge has no claim to be eternal and infallible, it is imperative to keep religion and the knowledge of religion as separate entities. However, in contemporary fundamentalism this understanding is reversed and the difference between religion and religious knowledge is collapsed, i.e. the interpretation of religion is held as religion. The profoundly heretical nature of this view emerges when one realizes that fundamentalism acts as if the ultimate and last interpretation of Islam has been (or could be) reached, which rests on the implicit postulation that theologians (*'ulama*) are capable of producing sacred and thus indisputable knowledge. Thus the logocentric character of the knowledge implied in the Qur'an has been transformed into a nomothetic one. While the former focuses on the 'truth', the latter underlines an 'identity'. Different claims of truth are possible to come together to attain a common denominator, but this is barely possible if one's aim is to establish totally different identity. The nomothetic ingredients within the logocentric systems can create this identity. To a controllable extent this nomothetic character is allowed, but if it dominates the logocentric side, the search for the truth and common good, then clash of identities commences. It would be helpful to remember that the source of nomothetic elements in Islam is the sayings of the prophet Muhammad rather than the Qu'ranic text.

Scholarly tradition throughout the centuries, whether of philosophical, theological, or mystical orientation, has stressed the centrality of knowledge in Islam in the strongest terms. Islam's finest scholars books on "Knowledge," in which one finds a long list of quotations from the first centuries of Islam, all insist on the significance of the pursuit of knowledge and learning-as a lifelong endeavor and as humanity's truest accomplishment. By contrast, the sole knowledge dear to Muslim fundamentalists is the knowledge of ritual and legal obligations; it is the knowledge of "things to be done." Their Islam corresponds to what Abdulkarim Soroush calls the "Islam of identity." Accordingly, what Soroush deplors most in today's Muslim world at large, not just in fundamentalism, is the loss of the "Islam of truth":

*"I believe that the Islam of identity should yield to the Islam of truth. The latter can coexist with other truths; the former, however, is, by its very nature, belligerent and bellicose. It is the Islam of war, not the Islam of peace. Two identities would fight each other, while two truths would cooperate."*<sup>1</sup>

### **3. Neo-Orientalism, Essentialism and Contingencies about Scripture and Muslims' Behavior**

If we observe the social and political debate on hand in modern-day Muslims, we can see that this has produced two schools of thought, whose members, through their reciprocal denigrating formula, have been termed neo-Orientalists and Apologists. So, following such a Manichaeian division, those suggesting that Islam leads to extremism have been classified as neo-Orientalists by those who deny that extremists are real Muslims; the neo-Orientalist has claimed that

---

<sup>1</sup> Jahanbakhsh, Forough, "Abdolkarim Soroush: New 'Revival of Religious Sciences,'" *ISIM Newsletter*, 8 (2001): 21.

this latter position was nothing other than apologetic. These both are the essentialist view of Islam. This distinction is to be rejected, because it is produced by political interests dealing with the Middle East crisis and in particular, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

It could mislead us to hold the idea that the behavior of Muslims through all centuries and countries can be explained primarily by reference uniquely to their belief system, which can be conceptualized as 'essentialism'.

'Essentialists' are those who argued that the Islamic world was dominated by a set of relatively enduring and unchanging processes and meaning, to be understood through the texts of Islam and the language it generated. By contrast, as Halliday describes them, 'contingencists' reject any universalistic framework and prefer to focus on the 'contingent' realities that exist in each Islamic country or socio-political situation (as Esposito).<sup>2</sup>

Essentialism is 'an ontology which stands outside the sphere of cultural influence and historical changes'. To this explanation there is something within Islamic faith which assumes axiomatic behavior for its members. Although there are axiomatic rules, they do not interpret themselves, on the contrary, they are interpreted in different times and in different cultures. Essentialists have discussed Islam but ignored Muslims, and in particular their identities. Identity is an emotional commitment through which people experience their autobiographical selves. This could explain why those Muslims who do not practice, (such as drinking alcohol, gambling, etc.) still define themselves as Muslim.

Essentialism is, to some extent, correct. If the people are religious, those everyday terms will in some way be influenced by their religious convictions, for it is in the nature of faith to claim effective sovereignty over human behavior. But here the scripture with its symbols dominates believers and it is not likely to hear the voice of religion nor the believers. We must admit that Islam could have more than one interpretation. Muslims in different geographies are not pure products of their religion. If so, the best Muslim could not be other than Muslim extremist who claim the literal structure of scripture.

Gellner claims that Muslims have some ideological cards, the crucial ones of which are: scriptural faith, a *completed* one (the final edition, so to speak) is available, and there is no room for further accretion or for new prophets; also, there is no warrant for clergy, and hence for religious differentiation; and, third, there is no need to differentiate between Church and State (between what is God's and what is Caesar's) since it began as a religion of rapidly successful conquerors who soon *were* the state ... The consequences of all this is that the trans-social standard which judges the social is a Book, and not Church.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Halliday, F., 'Review Article: "The Politics of Islam" – A Second Look', *British Journal of Political Sciences* 25 (3): p.401.

<sup>3</sup> Gellner, E., *Muslim Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981, p.100-1.

Gellner has presented Islam as something historically unique and overlooked the role that Muslim scholars play within the disparate Muslim traditions. It is true that Muslims do not have a centralized and hierarchical church, but it is equally true that the Qur'an cannot interpret itself. Socio-political and cultural dynamics mark the relationships between single Muslim believers and 'the Book'. This is what shows us the discrepancies among Muslim countries.

'Neo-Orientalist' and 'apologetic' positions generate much hot air, so a third middle ground is needed. And it is a cultural comprehension of Islam which will enable the observers to see that different cultural milieus are not but the field the scripture casts its seeds and according to this local atmosphere it harvests its products. Hodgson has suggested that a third way may be developed, combining the essentialists' and the contingencists' paradigms and concludes that the main feature of any Muslim philosophy is to achieve the Islamic ideal.

#### **4. Subordinating Scripture to the Politics: The Position of Islamists versus 'Ulamā (Muslim Scholars)**

Contemporary fundamentalism owes much of its success to Islam's scholarly vacuum. Whereas weakened scholarship throughout the Muslim world has allowed the rise of fundamentalism, one needs to pay attention to the eminent danger coming from leading fundamentalists who are aiming at disabling entirely the Islamic scholarly tradition, realizing all too well the threat that this tradition represents to fundamentalism's violent anti-Western ideology and generally to its attempt at controlling and manipulating Muslim societies.<sup>4</sup>

For more than a century, religion has been transformed into ideology by some Muslims, a tendency that is called Islamism: those whose agenda is politics rather than intellectualism or search for truth. This has been so, because ideology provided them a symbolic framework through which social reality can be reconstructed, maintained, and manipulated. These are barely possible through religious language or within religious tradition so they first transfer religion into ideology and popularize its language then attract people. This was the case in Marxism and Islam. As K. Marx transferred Maccabian Jewish terminology into Marxism to support bourgeois and proletariat, these ideologues transferred some Qur'anic terminology like weak and oppressed<sup>5</sup> into ideology to exploit. It is not surprising that some ideologues know Marxism or other ideologies far more than Islam. As John Esposito has argued:

*"... some people manipulate Islam as a political tool in order to change their societies or oppose 'imperialism'".<sup>6</sup>*

---

<sup>4</sup> Albertini, Tamara, "The Seductiveness of Certainty: The Destruction of Islam's Intellectual Legacy by the Fundamentalists", *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 53, No.4 (Oct., 2003), pp.455-470.

<sup>5</sup> Sūra Nisa 4: 75; 97; 98; 127.

<sup>6</sup> For detail see: Esposito, J., *The Islamic Threat: Myth and Reality?*, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999; *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, New York and Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002, p.IX.

In this progression, in order to prevent religion from being exploited politically, some scholars highlighted that there must be a clear cut division between religion and politics. For example Ali Abdel-Rāziq, an Azharī judge, accurately sparked a heated discussion in 1925, which is still alive even now, on whether Islam is a ‘religion that has a political character’ or not. In a re-interpretation style, he quoted numerous Qur’anic verses and prophetic traditions to argue that Prophet Muhammad only had ‘authority as a prophet’ and not dominions as ‘king or caliph’ and that he established ‘religious unity’ and not a “political state.” Abd el-Raziq’s position is quite similar to traditional *fiqh* opinions that made political leadership (*imāmah*) ‘an obligation based on rationality (*bi al-‘aql*) rather than revealed knowledge (*bi al-shar’*). The hot debate after Prophet Muhammad’s death whom to appoint as the ruler to Madina city state also signifies the fact that leadership in Islam is not religiously based matter, rather it is left to community itself.

More than anything else the Islamists, rather than taking religion as something individual, seek to implement Islamic law through the agency of the state. Not all are willing to resort to violent means in pursuit of this end. Many, such as Yusuf al-Qaradāwī, a highly influential Islamist and one of the most prominent ‘*ulamā*’ of contemporary Islam, profess democratic commitments. But whatever the stance toward either democracy or violence, the public implementation of the *shari’a* is at the heart of all Islamism, in both its Shi’i and Sunni forms. This suggests an important contrast with many among the ‘*ulamā*’.

Since the first centuries of Islam, the ‘*ulama*’ have often sought to maintain a careful distance from the ruling elite, jealously guarding their institutions and practices from governmental interference. The ‘*ulamā*’ generally recognized that the functioning of legal and other Islamic institutions presupposed the existence of a Muslim government, and they defined a legitimate government as one that oversaw the implementation of *shari’a* norms. They have typically understood the government’s commitment to the *sharia*’ to mean that the ruler defended the borders of the polity, regulated public morality, suppressed heretics, and appointed those proficient in legal matters to implement the law.<sup>7</sup>

In their passion to refute secularism, some writers and thinkers of the present age have gone so far as to characterize politics and government as the true objective of Islam, the reason why the prophets were sent, indeed the very reason for the creation of the human being. And they have not only given other Islamic commandments – for instance, on matters of worship – a secondary position, they have even deemed them to be mere means for political ends, just a way of training people (toward political mobilization).<sup>8</sup> More than anything else, Islamists seek to implement Islamic law through the agency of the state,

---

<sup>7</sup> Euben, Roxanne L. and Zaman, Muhammad Qasim (ed.), *Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden*, Princeton University Press, 2009, p.11; Also look: Crone, Patricia, *God’s Rule – Government and Islam: Six Centuries of Medieval Islamic Political Thought*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, 286-314.

<sup>8</sup> ‘Uthmani, M.Taqi, “Hakim al-ummat ke siyasi afkar.” in *Islam awr siyasat*, edited by Muhammad Ishak Multani, 21-76. Multan: “Idara-yi Ta’lifati Ashrafiyya”, Quoted by Muhammad Q. Zaman, *op.cit.*, p.12.

which amounts to nothing less than making religious norms subservient to political goals.

In order to differentiate religious aims from those of state, Muslim methodologists like Ibn Qutayba, Qarafi and Shah Wali Ullah underlined the two aspects of Prophet Muhammad: Muhammad as prophet and Muhammad as head of state, the former signifies his religious side, and the latter his ruler side. To this authoritative scholar, these two must be differentiated from each other. While the former has a binding religious character over Muslims, the latter has not. The fact that the rhetoric of Islam is not clear enough in these topics created a gap to be bridged by some figures.

Most Islamists including Hasan al-Bannâ, Sayyid Qutub, Mawdudî, examples of these figures, have no formal scholarly credentials in religious matters. A deliberate blurring of distinctions is likewise evident in the statement of the Sudanese Islamist Hasan al-Turabî (b.1932). Because all knowledge is divine and religious, a chemist, an engineer, an economist, a jurist are all *'ulama*, this could be the reason why al-Turabî supported Sudanese dictatorship to execute Muslim scholar Mahmoud Muhammad Tâhâ. They conceived Tâhâ's ideas as threat to theirs. Because Tâhâ emphasized the Makkan period of Muhammad, which is not political and considered it the very core of Islam not Madina, the political period of Islam.<sup>9</sup>

Mahmoud Muhammad Tâhâ is the anti-Qutb and his approach is crucial to conceive the scripture and its relation to current issues. Tâhâ, like Qutb, was hanged by dictatorship; he was executed, in 1985, for sedition and apostasy, after protesting the imposition of Sharia in Sudan by President Jaafar al-Nimeiri. In death, Tâhâ became something rare in contemporary Islam. His method of reconciling Muslim belief with twentieth-century values was, in its way, every bit as revolutionary as the contrary vision of Qutb. The real drama in Islam is the essential dilemma addressed by Tâhâ: how to revive ancient sacred texts in a way that allows one to live in the modern world.

To Taha, The Koran was revealed to Muhammad in two phases—first in Mecca, where for thirteen years he and his followers were a besieged minority, and then in Medina, where the Prophet established Islamic rule in a city filled with Jews and pagans. The Meccan verses are addressed, through Muhammad, to humanity in general, and are saturated with a spirit of freedom and equality; according to Tâhâ, they present Islam in its perfect form, as the Prophet lived it, through exhortation rather than threat. In Tâhâ's most important book, *The Second Message of Islam* (published in 1967, with the dedication "To humanity!"), he writes that the lives of the "early Muslims" in Mecca "were the supreme expression of their religion and consisted of sincere worship, kindness, and peaceful coexistence with all other people."

---

<sup>9</sup> See for detail: Tâhâ, Mahmud Muhammad, *The Second Message of Islam*, Syracuse: Syracuse University, 1987.

As Tāhā puts it in *The Second Message of Islam*, whereas Muhammad propagated “verses of peaceful persuasion” during his Meccan period, in Medina, a kind of compulsion was prevailed.” The Medinan verses are full of rules and coercion including the command for jihad, and in Tāhā’s view they were a historical adaptation to the reality of life in a seventh-century Islamic city-state, in which “there was no law except the sword.” At one point, Tāhā writes that two modest decrees of the Meccan verses—“*You are only a reminder, you have no dominion over them*”—were appended with a harsh Medinan edict: “*Except he who shuns and disbelieves, on whom God shall inflict the greatest suffering.*” In his distinctive rhetorical style, which combines dense exegesis with humanistic uplift, Tāhā observed, “It is as if God had said, ‘We have granted you, Muhammad, dominion over anyone who shuns and disbelieves, so that God shall subject him to minor suffering at your hands through fighting, then God shall also subject him to the greatest suffering in hell.’ . . . Thus the first two verses were abrogated or repealed by the two second verses.”

But something I have to add to these remarks: first, it was not jihad but Qital was ordered in Medina. Jihad was ordered in Mecca. As I will underline jihad does not mean a military action, unlike Qital which requires an organized body to offend or defend a land or expand it. Qital is related to land, while jihad is related to the individuals or community, which does not require any communal action or attack. As it was put forward by Mātūrīdī, jihad contains all efforts before qital/war and war itself.

Secondly, he is talking about the abrogation of some Meccan verses by Medinan ones. Most theologians rejected this abrogation and claimed that every single verse in the Qur’an is functional and authoritative so it is baseless to say that while in Mecca Muslims were not strong so the verses were defensive, but in Medina they became strong and accordingly offensive verses needed and all these abrogated the formers. Willingly or unwillingly, this doctrine of abrogation is nothing but eradication of many humanistic, self regarding, gentle and considerate styles the Holy Scripture has in its very nature.

The Medinan verses, directed not to Muhammad alone but to the community of early believers, became the basis for Sharia as it was developed by legal scholars over the next few centuries—what Tāhā calls the “first message of Islam.” In Tāhā’s revisionist reading, the elevation of the Madinan verses was only a historical postponement—the Meccan verses, representing the ideal religion, would be revived when humanity had reached a stage of development capable of accepting them, ushering in a renewed Islam based on freedom and equality. This “second message of Islam” is higher and better than the first, delivered by a messenger who came to seventh-century Arabia, in a sense, from the future. And, in the twentieth century, the time had come for Muslims finally to receive it. Tāhā offered a hermeneutical way out of the modern crisis



of Islam, allowing Muslims to affirm their faith without having to live by an inhumane code.<sup>10</sup>

## **5. How and Why Does Islamism Find Ground: The reason for Muslim's Anger and Frustration**

To avoid a unilateral evaluation, one must seek out the reasons why some Muslims militarize themselves in view of internal and external circumstances. There are some events that became catalysts for Muslims' deep frustrations.

The denigrated image of the prophet, for example, has a particular emotional value for Muslims, in particular when they are of South Asian origin. The perception that there have been different treatments of the three monotheistic religions triggers their frustration. To them, European anti-blasphemy laws protect Christians and Jews but not Muslims. They felt they were the children of a lesser God. Exclusionary and repressive political environments in their home country force Islamists to undergo a near universal process of radicalization, which has been witnessed by so many rebellious movements. Why they transform Islam into a means of rebellion is something else to be questioned.

Although the West, and most remarkably Europe, may be less Christian today, Muslims still view it as the Christian West. For a thousand years, from the days of Muhammad in the 7th century, Islam enjoyed a run of victorious conquest, interrupted only temporarily by the Christian Crusades. The time of conquest lasted until the failed siege of Vienna in 1683. After Vienna, and most dramatically under 19th and 20th century Western colonialism, Islam was sidelined from history--one of the main sources of the rage and resentment of today's jihadists.

The events of 9/11 have increasingly convinced some non-Muslims that Islam, as a faith, is incompatible with 'democracy' and 'civilization'. On the other hand, some Muslims strongly believe that the West has rejected and attacked Islam, not only as a religion but also as an identity. The fact is that the majority of contacts between Muslims and non-Muslims tend to be mediated by stereotypes which does not help reciprocal understanding, but instead facilitates reciprocal mistrust. This has recently caused a growing number of Muslims to experience imposed or self-imposed cultural and geographical ghettoization, which has negative effect on both sides of the issue, Muslim and non-Muslim. Although Muslims are not rejected completely, they are still perceived as 'aliens', 'different' and 'not ordinary' citizens, and the western institutions still perceive them as a peculiar population that needs to be 'placed in the new world order'.

Kepel writes that, 'Instead of pushing young people away from Islamist organizations, the explosions of 9/11 created a vortex into which some young

---

<sup>10</sup> For more detail see Packer, George, "The Moderate Martyr: A Radically Peaceful Vision of Islam", *The New Yorker*, 11 September 2006.

[http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/09/11/060911fa\\_fact1](http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/09/11/060911fa_fact1)

European Muslims were drawn.’<sup>11</sup> And accordingly some Muslims living in Western countries have developed a monolithic and ideological representation of ‘the West’ and, by contrast, a self-representation of their identity as monolithically Muslim. Therefore it is not surprising that the concept of jihad has developed an independent life beyond the classical theological Islamic understanding of it.<sup>12</sup>

To answer these questions, the mass media, politicians and often academics have focused on the political issues, on the alleged ‘clash of civilizations’, on the failure of multiculturalism, the invasion of Iraq, the alienation of Muslims, the social ghettoization of young South Asians, and the radical preachers and imams. All these factors might be the tiles of a complex mosaic, but still do not explain why the mosaic itself exists; why certain individuals, who profess themselves to be Muslim, have decided to kill themselves and innocent people in the name of jihad. Why do some Muslims understand jihad as murder while the majority reject such a view?

In order to create an unconventional frame for political side of Islam and to resist all these distortions, a very interesting plan has been implemented. This was the para-mosque structure that paved the way to propagating an alternative dimension to its classical religious and spiritual dimension. Alternative to the traditional mosque structures, newly born independent mosques could serve to the extremism, the example of which was seen in the contemporary Islam in Egypt and Pakistan, i.e. Hasan al-Bannā’ and Abul A’lā Mawdudī. These two deliberately bypassed the mosque and founded their own agencies.

Hasan al-Bannā felt that “sermons of the mosque would not suffice to curb the ever-growing evil” of Cairo, and as a consequence he began to send out teams of students to preach fundamentalist Islam in coffeehouses; these young people thus formed an embryonic para-mosque organization that later resulted in the Ikhwān al-Muslimūn. Mawdudī felt himself forced against his will to establish this sort of institution:

*“We have been compelled to form this organization as a last resort. For years I have been calling Muslims to turn away from the wrong paths and to concentrate their efforts on the mission entrusted to them by God. If all Muslims had accepted this call, all of whom would have constituted one single organization, an organization which would have enjoyed the status of al-Jama’ah.”<sup>13</sup>*

As a matter of fact, doctrinally Islam permits people to exercise this kind of authority without assigning it “religious”. The clergy-laity division is not intrinsic to Islam, so sometimes lay people assume religious authority and refer the scripture out of context quotation, which distrust and degenerate the very holistic meaning of the text. Some imams are forced, especially in the States

---

<sup>11</sup> Kepel, G., *The War for the Muslims, Islam and the West*, Cambridge, MA: Melnar Harvard, 2004, p.271.

<sup>12</sup> Marranci, Gabriele, *Jihad Beyond Islam*, Oxford and New York: Berg Publishers, 2006, p.9.

<sup>13</sup> Mawdudī, *Witnesses unto Mankind: The Purpose and Duty of the Muslim Ummah*, trans. By Murad, Khurram, Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1986, 73-74.

and in Europe, to assume multiple roles besides their being Imam. Demands for instruction in Islam, for “pastoring” to a congregation many of whose members may be having difficulties adjusting to a new culture, for visiting the sick and bereaved and providing family counseling, all press the imam to enlarge the scope of his functions. Since non-Muslim countries lack the foregoing institutions and personnel, the mosque must assume functions for which it was not originally designed and the imam must fulfill roles for which he receives no training. The American *masjid* is a multiplex, combining prayer room, educational center, political forum, social hall, informal law court, and counseling clinic, all under one roof. The imam assumes the role of educator, administrator, accountant, fund-raiser, political agitator, informal lawyer, and counselor. No man can effectively perform so many functions, assuming, of course, that there is even one imam for every mosque.

The transformation of the mosque into an “Islamic center” has allowed it to meet certain needs but has at the same time weakened its specifically religious character. Some Muslim institutions in America are indistinguishable from a local “country club” or “lodge, “ and the ethnicity typical of most serves to strengthen this image. In some instances dance halls have been added.<sup>14</sup>

The dissolution of the caliphate is also used as justification for the founding of para-mosque organizations. If this institution had remained intact it could perhaps have assumed a position analogous to that of the Roman Catholic bureaucracy, and individual activist organizations could have been subjected to its authority just as the monastic orders submitted to the authority of the papacy. Since such a possibility no longer exists, Muslims are left to their own devices.<sup>15</sup>

## 6. *Jihad versus Qital (war); Contemporary Context*

Let’s start from an ancient, but still relevant discourse which still animates the Muslim as well as non-Muslim debate: is jihad a holy war? Although the majority of Muslims emphatically reject such an axiom, we must recognize that historically a straightforward answer does not exist in Muslim mind. Sometime in history, the Islamic states had to face a difficult decision: to interpret the Qur’anic teaching so that any imperialistic aspirations had to be renounced, or to venture into philosophical and theological sophism and combine earthly desires with Allah’s injunctions. Muslim leaders in history have a privileged political interpretation of jihad over the spiritual and intellectual elements of Islam. So, jihad cannot be understood outside the historical contexts and events.

The term *jihad* is derived from the Arabic root *jhd*, to ‘strive’. The same *jhd* serves as the root for other verbs emphasizing effort and struggle to achieve perfection in difficult tasks. Unsurprisingly, *ijtihad*, meaning ‘to strive for understanding and interpreting the Qur’an for novel conditions’, has the same *jihad* root.

---

<sup>14</sup> Poston, Larry, *Islamic Da’wah in the West: Muslim Missionary Activity and the Dynamics of Conversion to Islam*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p.96.

<sup>15</sup> Poston, Larry, *op.cit.*, p.97.

Jihad certainly represents a sense of totalizing effort. In the Qur'an there are many examples in which such effort (e.g. economic, psychological and physical) has been required by the new-born Muslim community (The Qur'an, Sûrah 2: 218; 4: 95; 22: 78; 25: 53). So, jihad has totally diverse meaning from *qital* or *harb*.

At a purely linguistic level we should recognize that holy war in Arabic would sound like *harb al-muqaddasah* rather than jihad. Neither in the Qur'an nor in the *hadiths* (the sayings of Prophet Muhammad) can we find such an expression. The term Qur'an uses in terms of war is *Qital* and it has its own frame to be determined.

As a spiritual and practical guide for the Muslims, Qur'an has war as a theme. Pre-Islamic Arabic societies had developed a sophisticated military terminology, such as *sira'* (combat), *ma'raka* (battle), *harb* (war) and *qital* (killing). In the Qur'an the specific term *harb* is rarely used and *qital* is used only thirty-four times but not always with reference in killing one's enemies. For instance, *qital* is often found in verses that impose on human beings a respect for life in general. So, we can read:

*“Nor kill (or destroy) yourselves: for verily Allah has been to you most Merciful.”<sup>16</sup>*

*“If any one slay a person –unless it be for murder or spreading mischief in the land – it would be as if he slay the whole people”<sup>17</sup> and again;*

*“Take not life, which Allah has made sacred, except by way of justice and law.”<sup>18</sup>*

In these verses *qital* seems to be used in a way that rejects arbitrary killing. In terms of war, the Qur'an forbids useless violence, preserving civilians, and expressly dictating strict codes of conduct and engagement. Even in the case of war, Muslims have to restrict their aim to 'justice'.

All Muslims agree that the Qur'an allows Muslims to fight in two main circumstances: Self-defense and to maintain their basic rights including worship. In the following verse the technical term is *yuqātelūne* (*those against whom war is made*), which is passive voice. That means war can be waged only if a community is attacked:

*“To those against whom war is made, permission is given to fight, because they are wronged; and verily God is Most Powerful for their aid.”<sup>19</sup>*

And the following verse gives much more detail about the reasons of war:

*“They are those who have been expelled from their homes in defiance of right, for no cause except that they say “Our Lord is God”. If God did*

---

<sup>16</sup> Sûrah Nisā 4: 29.

<sup>17</sup> Sûrah Māida 5: 32.

<sup>18</sup> Sûrah An'ām 6: 151.

<sup>19</sup> Sûrah Hajj 22: 39.

*not check one set of people by means of another, there would surely have been pulled down monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, in which the name of God is commemorated in abundant measure ... .*<sup>20</sup>

One of the most worn and misread Qur'anic verses quoted to support the violent concept of *jihad* is Sûra Baqara 2: 191:

*“And wage war (slay) (qtulū) them wherever you catch them”.*

Often the second part of the verse and its historical and timely context is omitted by both Muslim extremists and anti-Islamic rhetoricians: ‘and turn them out *from where they have turned you out*; for tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter’. The context of the verse is war time. Here we can see much misreading, misinterpretation and ignorance on this verse.

It is a mistake to translate ‘*jihad*’ constantly as ‘fighting for the cause of Allah’. In the Qur’an it is clear that *jihad* is not related to fighting, rather *qital* is used in this regard. But the sayings of the prophet Muhammad regarding the *jihad* have been translated as ‘fighting’. Sahih al-Bukhari, traditionally the most trusted book after the Qur’an, is the main source of this mistranslation. In its fifty-second book e.g. chapter on ‘*jihad*’, the book allotted the meaning of *jihad* into ‘fighting’.

Ali al-Qārī argues that there are two kinds of *jihad*: the greater *jihad* (*al-jihad al-akbar*) and the lesser *jihad* (*al-jihad al-asghar*). Then another sub-categorization takes place and the greater *jihad* is divided into *jihad* of the heart (*jihad al-kalb*), *jihad* of the tongue (*jihad al-kalima*) and *jihad* of the hand (*jihad bi-al-yad*). ‘*Jihad* of the heart’ represents the struggle of the personal soul against worldly temptations in order to achieve spiritual purity. When Muslims reach this level, they may conduct ‘the *jihad* of the tongue’ by preaching Islam. Only when Islam is threatened and as a last resort, may Muslims conduct the *jihad* of hand or sword. It is important to be reminded that the Qur’an does not mention any of these categories. They are just theological products that reflect historical Muslim mind.

There are some other categories or connotations of *jihad* like *mujahada* and *mujadala*. *Mujahada* and *mujadala* could be taken as sub-categories of *jihad*, for after *mujahada* (self-discipline) one could be ready for *mujadala*, which is a dialectics, discussion and diplomacy: to strive to find a solution or to create much better as it is said in the Qur’an, Sûra Nahl 16: 125:

*“Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious...”*

Sûra Anqabût 29: 46:

*“And do not dispute with the People of the Book except in a way that is better, save with such of them who are unjust...”*

---

<sup>20</sup> Sûra Hajj 22: 40

As it has been seen, the Holy Scripture does not equate the People of the Book. While it classifies some of them as the equivalent people who do discuss and talk to generate what is better (*mujadala*) on the one hand, it labels some of them as iniquitous or evil with whom any discussion seems to yield no any result.

As a close category to jihad is *qital* (war), but they do not have any association. Because while jihad is encouraged, *qital* is permitted under compulsory conditions, that is on condition that the fundamental rights of any community are violated and in case of self-defence. While the two stages of jihad, namely mujahada and mujadala are encouraged, *Qital* (war) is permitted, it is not encouraged. Jihad is encouraged mostly in the Qur'anic verses revealed in Mecca where there was no any organized community to attack or to be attacked militarily. So the verses regarding *jihad* should be taken out of military context.

Yet war limited to self-defense was hardly the dream of any medieval king. So, the contradiction between the eighth-century military expansion of Islam and the Islamic injunctions against unjust, unprovoked wars became visible.<sup>21</sup> Muslim scholars were required by their rulers to resolve such a contradiction to allow expansionistic wars. Despite a famous *hadith* narrating how the Prophet Muhammad emphasized '*The best jihad is to speak a word of truth to a tyrant*', we can easily understand how many Muslim scholars preferred to favor their rulers' earthly desires rather than their theological beliefs. Heck is very right when he observes 'The Umayyad logic of state had profound and lasting effects on the Islamic conception of *jihad*: *jihad* as the tool of a state oriented towards expansion and became itself conceived as a tool in the service of territorial expansion, rather than a religious struggle at the level of devotion to God's cause'.<sup>22</sup>

The term jihad evokes differing sentiments. For some observers it conveys the idea of the fanatical Arab horseman, galloping wildly into battle with unsheathed sword flashing in the sun, offering men and women the choice of accepting Muslim religious traditions or death. Students of Islamic history, on the other hand, have tended in recent years to follow the thinking of T.W.Arnold, who downplayed the militant ideas connected with the term and sought to portray the Muslims as political liberators who were welcomed with open arms by the oppressed masses of the Middle East and North Africa.<sup>23</sup> It goes without saying that it is not the injunction of the Qur'an that one must fight for the spreading of Islam.

Bukhāri records the *hadith* "*wal-da'wah qabla al-qatl*" ("the invitation to Islam is essential before declaring war"). According to Rudolph Peters, this doctrine is based upon Sūras 17: 15 and 16: 125. "*We never send our wrath until we send an apostle to give a warning.*"<sup>24</sup> And the function of the summons is to

---

<sup>21</sup> Heck, P.L., "Jihad Revised", *Journal of Religious Ethics*, (2004) 32 (1): 95-128.

<sup>22</sup> *Op.cit.*, p.108.

<sup>23</sup> Poston, Larry, *Islamic Da'wah in the West*, p.13.

<sup>24</sup> Sūra Isra 17: 15

inform the enemy that the Muslims do not fight them for worldly reasons, like subjecting them, and taking their property, but that their motive is a religious one, the strengthening Islam.”<sup>25</sup>

In a similar context Imam Mâtūrîdî articulates that jihad comes before declaring war and it includes all intellectual arguments, proofs and discussions which are intended to convince the rival to ensure the peace.<sup>26</sup>

In short, the entire program of Muslim expansion may be interpreted as a measure by means of which the world may be made safe for Islamicity. Jihad in its proper meaning could be meant the conditions in which people will be receptive. According to Islamic theory of *jihad*, political subjugation was not an end in itself but rather a way to a greater end, whatever the motivation of particular individuals may have been. The political conquests were designed to create a milieu, an environment in which the Muslim faith could be planted, tended and harvested. Nehemia Levtzion notes that even modern Muslim historians stress “the role of temporal power in creating a total Islamic environment as a precondition of the fostering of the right attitude, a state of mind in individuals.”<sup>27</sup>

Mervin Hiskett pointed out that “military conquest cannot, of itself, force men to abandon their beliefs and ideas. But the Muslim political authorities can set up the institutions which, given time, will persuade them or pressure them into doing so.”<sup>28</sup> Of supreme importance was the establishment of contact between the non-Muslim population and adherents of the Islamic faith. This was retarded somewhat by the early tendency to isolate the Muslim warriors in specially built towns such as Basra, Kūfa, Fustat and Qayrawān. These garrison cities were built for the purpose of keeping the Muslim warriors from intermingling too quickly and too freely with the local populations, thus minimizing the risk that the new religion would be absorbed by indigenous traditions.

Some Muslims use the notion of war to bifurcate the world into two distinct parts: that part of the world under the domain of Islam (*dar al-Islam*) versus the rest of the world which is referred to as the domain of perpetual war (*dar al-harb*). Roughly speaking, it has been accepted that the mandate of Islam is to expand the domain of Islam until there is no longer perpetual war in the world and the way in which Muslims are to perform this fundamental obligation is to wage jihad. However, this division was reasonable when the world did not have a multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-ethnic structures. Britain or Germany was referred as the Christendom in the past, that meant the land of Christianity. Today how can we refer these countries as Christendom ignoring millions of different cultural and religious groups living there? Or how can

---

<sup>25</sup> Peters, Rudolph, *Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History* (New York: Mouton, 1979), p.18.

<sup>26</sup> Mâtūrîdî, *Ta'vilâtu 'l-Qur'an*, ed. Bekir Topaloğlu, İst., 2005-2011, vol.6, p.342.

<sup>27</sup> Levtzion, Nehemia, “Toward a Comparative Study of Islamization,” in *Conversion to Islam*, ed. Levtzion, N., (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1979), p.11.

<sup>28</sup> Hiskett, Mervin, cited by Levtzion in *ibid.*, p.11.

Muslims call these countries as *dar al-harb* (the domain of perpetual war or a candidate for a perpetual war), at least, without considering the Muslim population over there?

It is unfortunate that today with regard to jihad, mostly political analysts take the podium. One reason why some Muslims have associated jihad with violence, while the great majority reject this is its being part of any political jargon. And the jargon political analysts use creates a 'circle of panic', in which increasing number of many Western Muslims are becoming trapped. This 'circle of panic' is developed within the Muslim community by an undefined concept which has usually been referred when any event takes place like *jihad*. Overlooking the ethical dimension of this term, many identify it with war. In this case, the rumor spreading among Muslims says that an imagined monolithic 'West' wishes to wipe out Islam, and consequently, Muslim identities. This so-called threat may affect the emotions of certain Muslims to the degree that they feel *an act of identity* to be required in order to maintain a stable experience of their self. Because of the 'circle of panic', a certain rhetoric of jihad could easily become the preferred 'act of identity'.

## **7. Suicide Bombers and Hot Debates About (Un)justification of Their Acts**

The suicide bombers who are striking the Western and non-Western cities use a religious language, affirm religious identities and see the world through specific religious interpretation. Could we leave religion aside and take the matter as political, economical, etc.? Or do we have to blame Islam, the religion itself, like nicknamed neo-Orientalists who claim that Islam has prevented Muslims from enjoying modernization and left them in the dark times of Middle Age? To them to understand 9/11 attack we need to go back to medieval interpretations and to thinkers such as Ibn Taymiyya. These extreme essentialist viewpoints have facilitated odd arguments, such as the claim that Muslims are conducting jihad because they wish to transform non-Muslims into *Dhimmi*. Although sometimes it has been observed that this rhetoric is used by militant Islam, it would be extremely naïve to believe that behind such Islamic rhetoric there could exist medieval minds, which were quite intellectual and rational at the time.

As a matter of fact, Islamists mostly do not support suicide bombings. In an Oct. 12 "Open Letter to His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI," 38 distinguished Islamic religious authorities from Turkey, Egypt, Russia, Syria, Kosovo, Bosnia and Uzbekistan, delicately criticized some acts of Muslim terrorism, such as the killing of a nun in Somalia, but failed to address the relationship between religion and politics in Islam, or whether the "maintenance of sovereignty" includes, as radical *jihadists* claim, the violent reconquest of Western lands that were once Muslim. Whether out of conviction or fear of being targeted by terrorists, the 38 did not frontally reject the linkage between violence and the advance of Islam. It seems that Muslims of today still have a problem in understanding the relationship between faith and coercion. Violence is the enemy of reason. Violence has no place in the advancing of religion.



Similarly in an interview with Shaikh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah (2001) he says:

*“As for considering these acts (suicide bombings) as possible means to be used against U.S. policy – or any other policy, for that matter – we do not support this from an Islamic point of view. The reason we do not support is not because we do not believe in applying pressure on America, but because it is not right to pressure the American administration by targeting the American people, or others who reside there or who are visitors there, like those people who were working at the World Trade Center or visiting it. The Qur’anic precepts states: “No bearer of burdens should bear the burden of another.” This applies to all those victims who were not connected to the American administration or to any of its policies, not because they were Americans, but because they were Americans who were not aware of the issues of U.S. foreign policy. This is why it is not permissible, on the basis of the shari’a, or jurisprudentially, to commit such acts. This we declared immediately after the events in order to clarify that authentic Islamic values reject this and consider it terrorism, not martyrdom. Regardless of whatever good motives those who committed these acts may have had for doing what they did, these are wrong methods, in disharmony with Islamic thought. This is why it is wrong for anyone to consider this jihad, as jihad is not practiced in this manner.”<sup>29</sup>*

Similarly other scholars reject suicide bombings as unislamic. The 9/11 suicide attacks sparked significant debate in the Islamic world about the merits of suicide attacks.<sup>30</sup> Sheikh Muhammad Sa'id al-Tantawī, head of Cairo's Al-Azhar, the most prestigious university for Sunni jurisprudence, declared that the Shari'a rejects all attempts on taking human life.<sup>31</sup>

---

<sup>29</sup> Zaman, Muhammad Qasim, *op.cit.*, p.405.

<sup>30</sup> Malka, Haim "Must Innocents Die? The Islamic Debate over Suicide Attacks," *Middle East Quarterly*, Spring 2003, pp. 19-28.

<sup>31</sup> Closely associated with the discussion is the matter of the Muslims relation to Christians, Jews, Hindus, Budhists and those associate them with God, whom the Qur'an designates "People of the Book (*ahl al-kitab*). This subject is particularly important when the countries with highly Christian and Jewish people are concerned. Due to ambiguities existing in the Qur'anic text and later traditions, Muslims have experienced difficulty in determining the exact status of these people. Traditional Muslim understanding has not required the conversion of Jews or Christians to Islam, but has rather accorded them a somewhat nebulous position as *ahl al-dhimma* ("protected persons"). In return for paying *jizya* those people were left to themselves in religious matters. (In its classical meaning *jizya* means compensation. The derived meaning, which became the technical meaning, was a poll-tax levied from those who did not accept Islam, but were willing to live under the protection of Islam. There was no amount fixed for it, and in any case it was merely symbolical, - an acknowledgment that those whose religion was tolerated would in their turn not interfere with Islam. Imam Shafi'ī suggests one dinar per year, which would be the Arabian gold dinar of the time. But to my understanding the Qur'anic term *jizya* was misinterpreted as a permanent tax, it was just a war compensation paid only once.

Sometimes it is discussed whether Muslims have the right to intervene in the affairs of *Ahl al-Kitap*. The limit of this, if at all, is that Muslims are advised to call upon *Ahl al-Kitap* come to the universal concept of unity of God, to live a moral life and to cooperate on the

## Conclusion

Clearly, Muslims are genuinely appalled by the brutality of the terrorist acts, and some are going the extra mile to make sure their condemnation is made loud enough, and is repeated enough, so that they can be heard by the deafest of their critics. The Fatwa issued by the Religious Council of North America, and supported by major Muslim organizations, is the latest effort in this regard. The strong stand taken by American Muslim leaders against indiscriminate violence is a testimony of a remarkable maturity and the clarity of vision in dealing with a complex issue. The loud condemnation of terrorism is important to cut through the anti-Islam rhetoric and to reassure the public that Muslims reject indiscriminate violence and the killing of innocent civilians.

Muslim leaders must continue to speak against violence, brutality, and injustice, as they reject terrorism and indiscriminate violence against civilians and demand that the Islamic respect for the sanctity of human life, and the Islamic injunction against the killing of innocents be strictly observed. But this is not enough. Muslim leaders must go beyond the condemnation of terrorism to become more active in exposing the roots of violence, hatred, and terrorism. They must reject exclusivist ideologies that privilege particular religious or ethnic communities whether it takes the form of Jewish, Christian, or Muslim exclusivism. Moreover, the religious precepts that promise people a chaos and disorder about the end of the world (eschatology) must be revised and reinterpreted with common sense and a ‘theology of hope’ is to be created to assure serenity and peace on earth. And the following verse from the Holy Qur’an that equates killing of one single innocent person as the killing of whole people and saving one as saving whole must be a spiritual guide for all:

*“If any one killed a person –unless it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land – it would be as if he killed the whole people. And if any one saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole people... .”<sup>32</sup>*

And a verse from Bible must be taken as a spiritual guide for all who desire a peace created by all through common sense and good will:

*“Blessed are peacemakers.”<sup>33</sup>*

---

common good. This calls upon the common denomination among religions. As Sûra Al-i Imrân 3: 64 mentions:

*“Say: “O people of the Book! Come to common terms as between us and you that we worship none but God, that we associate no partners with Him, that we erect no from among ourselves lords and patrons other than God...”*

And Sûra Nahl 16: 125:

*“Invite all to the way of your Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious...”*

The preaching must be, not dogmatic not self-regarding, not offensive, but gentle, considerate. The manners and arguments should not be acrimonious, but modeled on the most courteous and the most gracious example for a universal conscious.

<sup>32</sup> Sûra Mâida 5: 35.

<sup>33</sup> Mathew 5: 9.

## **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

- Albertini, Tamara, "The Seductiveness of Certainty: The Destruction of Islam's Intellectual Legacy by the Fundamentalists", *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 53, No.4 (Oct., 2003).
- Crone, Patricia, *God's Rule – Government and Islam: Six Centuries of Medieval Islamic Political Thought*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Esposito, J., *The Islamic Threat: Myth and Reality?*, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999.
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, New York and Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002.
- Euben, Roxanne L. and Zaman, Muhammad Qasim (ed.), *Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden*, Princeton University Press, 2009.
- Gellner, E., *Muslim Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981.
- Halliday, F., 'Review Article: "The Politics of Islam" – A Second Look', *British Journal of Political Sciences* 25 (3).
- Heck, P.L., "Jihad Revised", *Journal of Religious Ethics*, (2004) 32 (1).
- Hodgson, Marshall, *The Venture of Islam*, 3 vol. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).
- Jahanbakhsh, Forough, "Abdolkarim Soroush: New 'Revival of Religious Sciences,'" *ISIM Newsletter*, 8 (2001): 21.
- Kepel, G., *The War for the Muslims, Islam and the West*, Cambridge, MA: Melnar Harvard, 2004.
- Levtzion, Nehemia, "Toward a Comparative Study of Islamization," in *Conversion to Islam*, ed. Levtzion, N., (New York:Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1979).
- Malka, Haim "Must Innocents Die? The Islamic Debate over Suicide Attacks," *Middle East Quarterly*, Spring 2003.
- Marranci, Gabriele, *Jihad Beyond Islam*, Oxford and New York: Berg Publishers, 2006.
- Mâtûrîdî, *Ta'vîlâtü'l-Qur'an*, ed. Bekir Topaloğlu, İst., 2005-2011, vol.6.
- Mawdudî, *Witnesses unto Mankind: The Purpose and Duty of the Muslim Ummah*, trans. By Murad, Khurram, Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1986.

Packer, George, “The Moderate Martyr: A Radically Peaceful Vision of Islam”, *The New Yorker*, 11 September 2006. [http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/09/11/060911fa\\_fact1](http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/09/11/060911fa_fact1)

Peters, Rudolph, *Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History* (New York: Mouton, 1979).

Poston, Larry, *Islamic Da'wah in the West: Muslim Missionary Activity and the Dynamics of Conversion to Islam*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Tāhā, Mahmud Muhammad, *The Second Message of Islam*, Syracuse: Syracuse University, 1987.

‘Uthmani, M.Taqi, “Hakim al-ummat ke siyasi afkar.” in *Islam awr siyasat*, edited by Muhammad Ishak Multani, 21-76. Multan: “Idara-yi Ta’lif-i Ashrafiyya.”